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Glossary  
Core premise: Intellectually and technologically we have the capacity 
to deliver on vision zero. 
Critical consciousness 
(aka conscientization): 
An understanding of causality, a grasp of the processes 
of history, and the ability to translate thought into 
action 
Dialogics: How the past is altered by the present as much as the 
present is directed by the past. 
Inherently safe[r] design Where designs are such that they can be built, used, 
maintained and eventually demolished without 
harming the safety health and wellbeing of those who 
work on the structure or are affected by it. 
Linguistic Analysis Used to describe and interpret the unconscious rules 
and processes that speakers of a language use to create 
the spoken and written word. 
Praxis: That is recognising the need to go beyond interpreting 
the world in various ways to the point where you 
change it. 
Social constructionism: The world as socially constructed by the people within 
it through their everyday interactions and practices 
Social constructivist: Emphasises how meanings and understandings emerge 
from social encounters. 
Sociolinguistics: Exploring the effect society has on the language. 
Sociology of language: Examining the effect that language has on society. 
Vision zero [harm] Vision zero or ‘Zero Harm’, as it is sometimes called, 
is a way of thinking that works on the principle that 
no-one, regardless of involvement, will be adversely 
affected by the company’s activities. At the very least 
addressing zero fatalities, zero life changing incidents 
to the very best of total zero harm. 
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in similar fields. 
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“A mind doesn’t make a mistake, just like that. There is a reason.” 
Winnie Mandela (1986)  
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Abstract 
In the 1990s the author embarked upon a project that would fundamentally alter 
the theoretical basis of safety, health and wellbeing management in the 
construction sector and beyond. The emerging risk management approach was 
flawed, relying on an element of chance to deliver safe outcomes. The author’s 
research into development and delivery of the Operation Analysis and Control 
(OAC) led to the realisation that vision zero (or zero harm) was achievable, given 
the intellectual and technological capability at our disposal. What was missing 
was an understanding of the delivery mechanisms, how in fact could the intellect 
and technology be positively exploited to make zero harm a real possibility. The 
OAC model, developed from first principles, free from preconceived notions, 
attached to the then risk assessment (and the emerging risk management) 
approaches was so unencumbered that it was to become recognised by ISSA for 
its cross-jurisdictional and cross-disciplinary nature.  
The major thrust has been to establish the efficacy of the OAC approach within 
the construction industry. While OAC was in essence a model with a focus on 
designing operation processes, leading ultimately to zero harm there was another 
side to the coin, namely safe design or more correctly inherently safe[r] design, 
the ability to deliver on the prevention through design agenda. Here the OAC had 
a direct impact on the aim of delivering prevention through design, becoming a 
major feature of the PtD education approach, demonstrating a strong inter-
relationship between the projects. 
Delivering safety management as a quality systems approach set a new theoretical 
foundation upon which future health and safety education, training and 
performance could be built. The new paradigm (OAC) put workers at the heart of 
safety management, not as an adjunct as was implied in the accepted norm at the 
time. The production and proving of the OAC model and the scholastic work 
associated with developing Prevention through Design (PtD) learning and 
teaching packages are examples of outputs from the author’s original work in 
safety, health and wellbeing. The original and guiding premise was that: 
“Technologically and intellectually we have it within our capability to [deliver 
vision zero] prevent fatal or life altering accidents from ever occurring…”  
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Workers need to be at the heart of safety management not external agents affected 
by its consequences and with acceptance of competence and agency (active 
participation) comes cognition; the ability for workers to challenge their historical 
and social situation. 
This thesis presents a critical reflection of the author’s work, using two major 
projects as exemplar outputs; OAC model and Prevention through Design 
education. The reflection discusses the interrelationship between the projects, 
including a synthesis of the author’s work as demonstrated by the projects 
presented. There is commentary on the current standing of the projects together 
with a critical review of the significant and original contribution the author’s work 
makes to the academic field of construction safety, health and wellbeing. 
A concluding chapter addresses lessons learnt and advances the author’s thoughts 
on further research in this area, exploring where the OAC model and Prevention 
through Design should go next in pursuit of vision zero harm in construction. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Aims of the review 
This review sets out to explain the rationale behind the author’s research and 
development work in the field of safety, health and wellbeing since the early 
1990s. Through the use of two significant exemplar project outputs the author 
seeks to demonstrate that a sufficiently high level of work, worthy of the award of 
PhD by portfolio, has been produced in the intervening period. The review will 
comprise a critical reflection of the two projects; their use and their value to the 
design and construction community, indicating where appropriate their relevance 
and impact. The exemplar projects: 
1. Project 1: Operation Analysis and Control (OAC) - detailed reflection and 
critique presented in Chapter 4 
2. Project 2: Prevention through Design (PtD) Education - detailed reflection 
and critique presented in Chapter 5. 
This synthesis of the author’s work is supplemented by substantial evidence in the 
form of published papers, books, book chapters, databases, CDs and websites as 
well as audit and accident reports. A full training package for the Prevention 
through Design training project and the evaluation document from the MEng/ 
BEng safety Engineering and Disaster Management degree programme, offered at 
Ulster University is available, as are the relevant papers published over the years 
(and appropriately referenced in this critical reflection). This review demonstrates, 
across the range of work presented and critiqued, that there has been the creation 
and interpretation of new knowledge. In presenting the original research and 
advanced scholarship in the field of civil engineering construction and design the 
thesis also discusses the appropriate nature of the chosen research methods and 
their applicability in the delivery of the project outputs.  
The core premise guiding author’s research and publications has always been that 
intellectually and technologically we have the capacity to deliver on vision zero. 
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1.2 Structure of the review   
The review will discuss originality across a number of key themes: 
 Vision zero as it relates to construction; 
 Technical and Intellectual capacity to deliver vision zero; 
 Prevention through design; 
 Safe to start, safe to execute and safe to finish; and 
 Competent to become competent 
This originality discussion is followed by a critical reflection of the research 
methodologies, including a discussion on the application of systems thinking to 
safety, health and wellbeing, before moving on to discuss the use of dialogics1 and 
praxis2 in the development of the Operation Analysis and Control (OAC) model 
for safety; a paradigm shift in construction safety management.  
A reflective interpretation of the exemplar projects follows with supporting 
evidence where appropriate. With each project the author offers a justification for 
its design and delivery as well as a critique of its successful implementation. The 
review concludes with a chapter contemplating the impact of the original 
contributions, what the future holds for safety, health and wellbeing research in in 
construction and the lessons learnt along the ways. 
 
1.3 Background to the exemplar projects 
In the 1990s the author embarked upon a project that would fundamentally alter 
the theoretical basis of safety, health and wellbeing management in the 
construction sector and beyond. The emerging risk management approach was 
flawed, relying on an element of chance to deliver safe outcomes. 
                                                 
1 How the past is altered by the present as much as the present is directed by the past. 
2 That is recognising the need to go beyond interpreting the world in various ways to the point 
where you change it. 
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From an early and close examination of confined spaces entry fatalities the author 
developed a management approach, focused on delivering a ‘no deaths in 
confined spaces’ agenda. The early developments in this ‘no deaths’ or ‘towards 
zero fatalities’ approach (McAleenan and McAleenan 1999), introduced an 
original thought to safety management, which developed into a model with the 
capacity to expand across all facets of safety, health and wellbeing.  
What emerged was the OAC model, developed from first principles, free from 
preconceived notions, attached to the then risk assessment (and the emerging risk 
management) approaches. Consequently, since OAC was so creative in its outlook 
it became recognised by ISSA for its cross-jurisdictional and cross-disciplinary 
nature. Nevertheless, the major thrust has been to establish the efficacy of the 
OAC approach within the construction industry, an industry with a sufficiently 
poor accident track record, an industry that could benefit from an enthusiastic 
boost in its delivery of safe and healthy projects. While OAC was primarily 
designed with a focus on designing a safe operation or process leading ultimately 
to vision zero harm there was another aspect to consider, its ability to deliver 
prevention through design.  
A specific iteration of OAC, design safety analysis and control (DSAC), Table 
1.1, concentrated on PtD and on the built environment (McAleenan and 
McAleenan 2004). DSAC became central to the delivery of the PtD ethos and 
formed the mainstay of the educational work that was to follow. 
 
Table 1.1: Design Safety Analysis and Control [PtD] 
Stage Key Questions for Designers 
Analysis What are the sources of harm presented by the project? 
What is to be done to eliminate or control them? 
Are the controls effective? 
Management What are the sources of harm presented by the project? 
What is to be done to eliminate or control them? 
Are the controls effective? 
Effectiveness 
review 
How well is the project progressing?  
What design changes are necessary to ensure project success?  
When should the next review take place? 
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1.4 Original contributions and interrelationships between projects 
Critical theory explains what is wrong with the current social reality, identifies the 
actors who can change it and provides the clear norms for achievable practical 
goals for social transformation. Operational analysis and control was developed 
on the premise that workers, engaged in the decision making process, where they 
have direct involvement in the work can and will make the right decisions, that is 
the decisions that will have a positive impact on their safety, health and wellbeing. 
The change that such an approach made on the worker and the worker’s 
environment was, what is often referred to in more recent times as empowerment 
yet such a term is a disservice to the value such changes to workers’ involvement 
truly make. Autonomy and agency (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2014) is a much 
more powerful description as it was that new dynamic that recognised and 
encouraged a worker driven collaboration with management that delivered real 
improvement in safety, health and wellbeing across the whole of the workplace 
(Freire, 1973; Garavan, 1997; Ayers and McAleenan, 2008; McAleenan and 
McAleenan, 2008).  
The successful implementation of OAC in the initial stages of development and 
delivery relied upon the author as the champion, being close at hand and having 
excellent persuasive powers, particularly since as safety engineer and advisor to 
the organisation position power was not an option. However senior management 
accepting the premise and commitment to its successful implementation made the 
transition to the new regime much smoother.  
Extending the OAC ideas and ideals from the worker to the designer, placing a 
strong responsibility and presenting a great opportunity, was evident in the 
emerging prevention through design approach of the early 2001s defined as the 
capacity to deliver project designs that could be built, used, maintained and 
eventually demolished without causing harm to workers or anyone impacted by 
the structure (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2004). A thought implicit in the 
Robens Report (Robens, 1972) and in the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 
1974 (OPSI, 1974), and a requirement in the UK Standard for Professional 
Engineering Competence (Engineering Council, 2014) but one that has yet to be 
completely addressed in the engineering design community.  
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Fittingly, OAC was capable of being customised and a derivation; Design Safety 
Analysis and Control (DSAC), was formed; the embodiment of prevention 
through design (PtD) and a clearly practical way forward for designers 
(McAleenan and McAleenan, 2004). However, despite the apparent 
straightforwardness of the approach it was apparent to the author that what was 
needed was education, across the spectrum to ensure that the underlying principles 
and associated processes, necessary to successfully deliver on PtD, became a part 
of the engineers’ psyche.  
The essence of good engineering is the bringing together art and science to deliver 
projects that truly benefit the wellbeing of society. The education process to 
embed PtD would have to involve experienced and developing designers and 
consequently the vehicle for delivery needed to be diverse, flexible, robust, 
reliable and cognisant of the fact that there are many routes followed in the 
development of engineering competence (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2009; 
2010; 2011; Tymvios et al, 2015). 
Laterally the author co-developed the Organisation Cultural Maturity Index 
(OCMI), which was initially developed to give a numerical value to indicators 
otherwise considered intangible (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2009: 2011; 2014). 
The unexpected discovery within OCMI was the diagnostic functionality of the 
product (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2014). The two models OAC (McAleenan 
and McAleenan, 2001; 2002) and OCMI (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2009: 
2011; 2014), although designed years apart are integral tools for successful safety 
management in the construction industry. 
The author now believes that any organisation seeking to implement an OAC/ PtD 
approach should start with a full diagnostic analysis of the company, analyse the 
results and implement any recommendations before contemplating any additional 
interventions (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2014). Within this realisation lies the 
key to the interrelationship between the projects. Originality and contributions to 
new knowledge as well as the interrelationships between projects are included 
throughout this thesis, showcasing the ongoing developmental nature of the 
author’s work.  The key originality themes discussed include: 
 Dialogics and Praxis: Connecting quality and safety; 
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 Vision zero as it relates to construction safety; 
 Technological and intellectual capacity to deliver vision zero; 
 Prevention through Design (PtD); 
 Safe to start, safe to execute and safe to finish; and  
 Competent to become competent. 
The specific details on how each of the key themes contributed to originality of 
thought and the industry impact are presented in Chapter 2. Thereafter follows 
specific discussions on and relevant examples of originality within the projects 
outputs chapters; Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. A final critical reflection on the 
efficacy of the projects in the achievement of their overall aims is addressed in 
Chapter 6, the concluding chapter.  
 
1.5 Projects Outputs 
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show the development of and connections in the exemplar 
projects. This is followed by Table 1.1, which gives a breakdown of exemplar 
projects outputs in a chronological order, indicating the interrelationship between 
the projects and the original outputs through the years. 
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Figure 1.1: OAC Development and Connections. 
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Figure 1.2: PtD Development and Connections. 
 
 
  23 
Table 1.2: Exemplar Projects Timeline and Interrelationships. 
 
Year 
Main Outputs Exemplar Projects 
Papers Books Other OAC PtD 
   CD ROM: Confined Spaces Expert OAC  
1999   




Dynamic Safety Management in the 
Construction industry 
  OAC  
2001   
NI Safety Group/ National Irish Safety 
Organisation Occupational Safety Award 
OAC  
2002 
A Different Approach – Operational 
Analysis and Control 
  OAC  
   
Prevention through Design Training 
Manuals 
 PtD 
2002/ 07   OAC related websites OAC  
2004 
Safety in Design – A Risk Assessment 
Approach 
   PtD 
2004   
Protocols for Low Voltage Working, 
Temporary Traffic Management, 
Contractors’ Relationships Protocol, and 
Manual Handling of Kerbs. 
OAC PtD 
2004 
Highway Work Zones – A Safe Method 
of Working 
  OAC PtD 
2004 
Design Safety Analysis and Control - 
Explained 
   PtD 
2005 Prevention – A Universal Responsibility   OAC PtD 
2006   
ISSA Imhotep Award for Good Innovative 
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Table 1.2: Exemplar Projects Timeline and Interrelationships (cont’d). 
 
Year 
Main Outputs Exemplar Projects 
Papers Books/ Chapters Other OAC PtD 
2006   Operation Analysis and Control – Poster OAC  
2006   OAC related databases OAC  
2007 
Competence: Redefining the Matrix of 
Authority 
  OAC PtD 
2009 
An Exploration of Structured and 
Flexible Approaches to Recognising 
Engineering Competence 
   PtD 
2010  
ICE Manual of Health and Safety in 
Construction (1st Edition) 
 OAC PtD 
2010 
Calculating Your Flight Distance – the 
Evolution of the Competent Company 
  OAC  
2011 
Safety: Turning the Event into a Process: 
15 years on. 
  OAC  
2011   
Methodology for the Evaluation of 




Enhancing Ethical Reasoning in Design 
Education  
   PtD 
2012  
Managing Safety in Construction: Nuclear 
New Build 
 OAC PtD 
2013  
Health and Safety for Construction 
Professionals 
 OAC PtD 
2015  
ICE Manual of Health and Safety in 
Construction (2nd Edition) 
 OAC PtD 
2015   
Safety Engineering and Disaster 
Management Degree Programme. 
 PtD 
2015 Revisiting Lorent    PtD 
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Chapter 2. Key Originality Themes 
2.1 Introduction to key originality themes 
This chapter discusses where the author’s work has demonstrated the creation and 
interpretation of new knowledge, through original research and advanced 
scholarship. This and the subsequent chapters present a critical reflection of the 
significance the work has made to the academic field. 
 
2.2 Dialogics and Praxis: Connecting quality and safety 
The author explored the relevance of the connection between quality management 
and safety management though the dialogics lens; that is how the past is altered by 
the present as much as the present is directed by the past, and though praxis; that 
is recognising the need to go beyond interpreting the world in various ways to the 
point where you change it. In examining the work of Aristotle (cited in Illich, 
1971), Marx (1845), Freire (1970), Illich (1971) and Crosby (1979) the author 
made a distinction between the essential elements that allowed a thorough 
comparison of quality and safety, establishing whether a robust and practical link 
existed. It is worth noting that in late 1990s into the early 2000s, all across Europe 
the quality/ safety link was uncommon.  
In a survey, carried out in 2000 by the European Agency for Safety and Health at 
Work 3  (EASHW) into the state of occupational safety and health across EU 
Member States (EASHW, 2000) there was no mention of quality management and 
interestingly very little reference to safety management either. The EASHW 2000 
Annual Report (EASHW, 2001) discussed quality but in relation to the quality of 
service provided, not quality management. A case for making the link and for 
developing an appropriate model had to be compelling and suitable projects to 
prove the model’s worth found. Are quality management and quality processes a 
modern phenomenon, the product of management strategists in the post world war 
II industrialization era or are they an innate construct of a longer held 
‘weltanschauung’ (or world view), manifesting in various iterations to address 
                                                 
3 European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EASHW) later became EUOSHA. 
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specific societal needs? Citing Aristotle, Illich (1971) ascribes that Aristotle 
revealed ‘making’ and ‘acting’ to be so different that one never includes the other. 
Modern technology, Illich (1971) argued, had increased man’s ability to 
relinquish the "making" of things to the machine, and in so doing had increased 
the time available for "acting" and as a consequence developing systemic 
educational, quality-centric approaches to action.  
The term used by Aristotle for ‘making’ was "poesis," and the word he employed 
for ‘doing’ was "praxis." And it is this term ‘praxis’ associated with ‘doing’ (or 
action) that formed the basis for the development of the advanced social activist 
tool; the praxis model, predominant in the strategic thinking of 20th century 
socially responsible educationalists (Freire, 1970; 1973). The praxis model, 
considered carefully and modified appropriately became the foundation from 
which OAC emerged. 
 
2.3 Vision Zero as it relates to construction safety 
The concept of vision zero is heralded as emanating in 1997, with Sweden’s 
Vision Zero Initiative [VZI] (Vision Zero Initiative, 2015). The proposition being 
that accidents do not happen in isolation; they are not without human impact, 
neither in their cause nor in their effect. Do accidents happen to people or do 
people cause accidents? Either way human factors need to be taken into account 
when designing ‘vision zero’ safe systems. Workers are not just pawns on 
someone’s chessboard to be sacrificed for the greater good. Rather the greater 
good recognises that workers are indeed major players in the game, with all the 
skills and autonomy needed to deliver a safe and healthy product without a 
negative impact on their wellbeing. If only they were allowed to do so. Fromm 
(1947) contended that what was good for the individual must also, of necessity, be 
good for humanity. Sweden’s VZI, with it specific road safety focus has a ‘No 
loss of life is acceptable’ approach (Vision Zero Initiative, 2015) which sums up 
the challenge.  
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What was clear then as it is now was that even in the area of road safety, driver 
education, enforcement and car design and manufacture were critical aspects of 
the initiative. In considering the societal impact infrastructure design and 
development has civil engineers can positively impact on their environment, while 
meeting their social responsibility, through the elimination of many of the 
obstacles to vision zero. This is a core tenet of the engineers’ code of ethics and a 
central theme in the Institution of Civil Engineer’s Royal Charter (ICE, 2014).  
Even if the challenge for engineers wasn’t immediately recognised vision zero 
brought with it the potential for prevention through design to become the 
engineers’ mantra. Through this developing prevention through design mindset 
designers can have it within their gift to deliver, at the very least zero fatalities 
and zero life changing incidents up to and including the very best situation of total 
zero harm.  
In today’s internet-age it is hard to recall a time when information sharing wasn’t 
universal and virtually instantaneous. In the late 1990s the spread of information 
sharing was much slower and more niche focused, consequently rapid growth in 
the spread of knowledge and in the opportunity for other communities to react to 
and join in with initiatives was much more limited. That said, there is every 
reason to believe that whenever conditions are right similar ideas, from other 
thinkers around the world, can emerge synchronously. Where the vision zero 
initiative in Sweden (Vision Zero Initiative, 2015) related solely to road safety the 
author’s proposed vision zero harm approach across all facets of the construction 
industry (McAleenan and McAleenan, 1999) was an original idea, leading directly 
to the equally original idea of Prevention through Design (McAleenan and 
McAleenan, 2004; Tymvios et al, 2015). 
 
2.4 Technological and intellectual capacity to deliver vision zero 
Delivering safety management as a systems approach, akin to quality management 
was setting a new theoretical foundation upon which future health and safety 
education, training and performance was to be built. The author’s Operation 
Analysis and Control paradigm (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2001; 2002) put 
workers at the heart of safety management, not as an adjunct as was implied in the 
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accepted norm at the time. “I[t] should be the primary role of Risk Management 
to aim for complete control of risk” (Subject C, from online critical discourse 
2001, Appendix 4). The production and proving of the OAC model (McAleenan 
and McAleenan, 2001; 2002) and the educational work associated with 
developing Prevention through Design (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2001; 2002; 
Tymvios et al, 2015) learning and teaching packages are examples of outputs 
from the author’s original work in safety, health and wellbeing. The work began in 
the late 1990s to address a specific problem with safety and health management 
arrangements in the construction/ civil engineering industry. At the time and still 
today there were issues with eliminating fatal incidents and significantly reducing 
or eliminating any and all sources of harm in the industry. The initial concept 
derived by the author (McAleenan and McAleenan, 1999) and held to be true 
throughout the development and delivery of a range of workplace safety, health 
and wellbeing related projects in the intervening years was that: 
“Technologically and intellectually we have it within our capability to 
[deliver vision zero] prevent fatal accidents from ever occurring.”  
Workers need to be at the heart of safety management not external agents affected 
by its consequences and with acceptance of competence and agency (active 
participation) comes cognition; the ability for workers to challenge their historical 
and social situation. Systems function as a whole and they cannot nor should they 
be analysed in terms of their individual components. Kincheloe (1991) referred to 
this as devoting “…attention to issues of human dignity, freedom, authority and 
social responsibility”. Where workers’ critical conscientiousness is recognised 
concerns with problem solving would transcend towards a determination of the 
aetiology of the problem; the reasons behind how things are. Introducing praxis, 
dialogic and critical reflection into safety management was a unique and unusual 
approach to adopt where engineers, construction managers and battle-hardened 
clients were concerned. Linguistic analysis has never been a critical engineering 
skill, but in reshaping the world of safe and healthy working it is a necessary 
approach in order to firstly understand the unconscious rules and processes that 
 TOC 29 
tend to govern us and ultimately to refocus and present a new and original 
paradigm; OAC (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2001; 2002). This principled 
approach had potential to achieve significant improvements in safety and health 
performance, moving the industry away from accepting that accidents happen 
towards the belief that zero harm is a very real and achievable objective. This was 
the cornerstone of all that had emerged from the author’s work from that point 
onwards. Indeed, not only was critical reflection an unusual approach but vision 
zero in the construction industry of the late 1990s was uncommon.  
 
2.5 Prevention through design (PtD) 
In 2001 at a joint Health and Safety Executive/ Quarry Products Association (NI) 
seminar the author’s first iteration of PtD principle was made public; “Design it, 
Build it; Maintain it; and Demolish it taking full account of the safety of the 
construction worker, the end user and anyone else who may be affected” 
(McAleenan 2001). At the 2004 American Society of Safety Engineers (ASSE) 
professional development conference the author presented and discussed the 
concept (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2004). The author further made this 
original PtD thought known publically, in the UK at a 2005 ICE CDM conference 
and privately (at the same event) to the HSE inspector charged with writing the 
revision consultation document for the CDM 2007 Regulations. During the 
consultation process the author proposed that the PtD principle become part of the 
new regulations and/ or Approved Code of Practice (McAleenan and McAleenan 
20054). In the search for a new approach to construction safety management the 
author conducted a critical evaluation of that which is required of practicing 
                                                 
4 A version of this premise was then published in the CDM Approved Code of Practice of 2007, 
showing how the author’s ideas are reflected in the UK legislative requirements “…designers’ 
responsibilities extend beyond the construction phase of a project. They also need to consider the 
health and safety of those who will maintain, repair, clean, refurbish and eventually remove or 
demolish all or part of a structure as well as the health and safety of users of workplaces...” 
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professional engineers in the Institution of Civil Engineer’s (ICE) Royal Charter 
(ICE, 2014) and that which is defined in UK Standard for Professional 
Engineering Competence (UK SPEC) “Prepare, present and agree design 
recommendations, with appropriate analysis of risk, and taking account of cost, 
quality, safety, reliability…” (Engineering Council, 2014). Although updated to 
2014 versions the requirements to deliver designs that can be built, used, 
maintained and eventually demolished without causing harm to workers or users 
(aka prevention through design) could have been inferred from text that dates 
back to 1828 when the ICE’s Royal Charter was first granted “All members shall 
have full regard for the public interest, particularly in relation to matters of 
health and safety, and in relation to the well-being of future generations” (ICE, 
2014). The current state of safety, health and wellbeing in construction would 
suggest that the author’s core premise was either true but was not being fully 
followed or that it was untrue and thus the professional bodies were failing in the 
exercise of their Charter responsibilities.  
The success5 behind any construction project begins with a Client’s willingness to 
commission a project that will bear the test of time and stand acknowledged by 
present and future generations as a symbol of excellence in the built environment 
and that excellence must embrace safety health and wellbeing of all people 
impacted by the design and presence of the structure. The translation of the 
Client’s desire into a finished project falls to designers (engineers, architects etc.), 
constructors and appropriate advisors. What role then for regulation? 1994 saw 
the introduction of the first of the Construction (Design and Management) 
Regulations (CDM), the UK’s response to the EU Directive 92/57/EEC temporary 
                                                 
5 The measure of success transcends cost, quality and time. Any human loss negates project 
success. 
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or mobile construction sites (EUOSHA, 2015). In a response to the HSE 
consultation into the revision of the CDM Regulations, where HSE had indicated, 
 “…[that] designers are in a unique position to eliminate or reduce the 
risks that arise during construction work and have a key role to play in the 
design and management of construction projects” 
the author responded suggesting that in their update to CDM that HSE should 
fully embrace the prevention through design principles; defined by the author as: 
“Construction projects must be designed to be built, used, maintained and 
eventually demolished in a manner that does not cause harm to 
construction personnel, end users, maintenance operatives, demolition 
specialists, and others who may come into contact with the project.” 
(McAleenan and McAleenan, 2005) 
The author’s original PtD definition (McAleenan, 2001) was a progression from 
the earlier OAC model developments, of the late 1990s, leading to the 
development of the Design Safety Analysis and Control model (McAleenan and 
McAleenan, 2004) and the Safe to Start checklist process, presented to World 
Congress on Safety and Health, 2011. Various alternative wording existed, such 
as Safety in Design (SiD) and Safety through Design (StD) have been used as 
descriptors of the same PtD ideal. On the interface between clients, designer, 
engineer and contractor PtD requires the acceptance of project objectives that 
include tasks or activities being completed on time and in a manner that does not 
cause harm to the employees, customers, other non-employees, or the company. 
This approach recognised that some hazards can be eliminated or contained 
through good engineering design solutions and others, inherent in the process, 
have to be safely worked around. In all cases it is essential to identify at the 
earliest opportunity what hazards exist, the harm that can result and how they 
might materialise. Fundamentally this necessitated a full analysis of the design 
safety issues, followed by the development of appropriate controls to ensure that 
work operations during the construction phase proceeded in a manner that makes 
certain that people, plant and property are protected from harm prior to, during 
and after the work operation, regardless of the nature of the hazards faced.  The 
 TOC 32 
author moved to align PtD thinking with inherently safe design thinking (Kletz 
1978); the idea being that it is the designers’ approach rather than a specific set of 
tools and technologies that determines whether safety in design is achievable. The 
design safety analysis and control (DSAC) approach (McAleenan and 
McAleenan, 2004), a derivative of the Operation Analysis and Control (OAC) 
model (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2001; 2002) integrated all aspects of the 
construction design project process. Underpinning this approach was the absolute 
control of all stages of the process. The DSAC model (McAleenan and 
McAleenan, 2004) was apt for ensuring that the requirements of EC Directive 
92/57/EEC (EU OSHA, 1992) could be met, with particular reference to project 
preparation. 
 
2.6 Safe to start, safe to execute and safe to finish 
From the earlier days of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (OPSI, 
1974) an often misinterpreted approach to safety was that risk was inherent and 
that consequently accidents were somehow inevitable. However, to think and to 
act in a manner that suggested this was true was a serious disservice to the 
workers who rely upon best advice to complete their work without hurt or ill 
health. Safe design applies to the design of a work operation as much as it does to 
the design of a structure. What happened when the EU inspired management 
regulations were enacted in the 1990’s was that a focus was put on risk assessment 
and the consequential misinterpretations and misinformation (Lofstedt, 2011) led 
to a plethora of written risk assessment and the mistaken belief that risk, as it 
applied to workplace safety, health and wellbeing was something that could be 
managed. The author’s view was that projects needed to be managed with safety 
and quality on an equal footing. If the approach to quality targeted zero defects 
then, by extension, zero defects implied zero harm. That wasn’t a part of 
management thinking in the late 1990s, until the author introduced it into the 
Roads Service. McAleenan and Orr (1999) asserted:  
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“…Safety cannot be treated as an event or a series of single events spread 
across the working year. It is a thought process within each of us that can 
and should be reinforced through the production of original and thought 
provoking material…’.  
Following conversations at the 2001 ISSA Construction Safety Symposium in 
Paris, the author aligned the OAC model with the USA, National Institution for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) thinking that accidents are ‘preventable 
injuries’, (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2001). This approach, taken in harmony 
with the views from education, quality and indeed value engineering reinforced 
the true value of introducing ‘critical reflection’ as a central and unique aspect of 
the thought process endemic in the praxis approach to workplace safety, health 
and wellbeing. Safe to start, safe to execute and safe to finish, discussed by the 
author at World Congress (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2011) was the 
outworking of the interrelationship between the two central and original ideas of 
vision zero harm and PtD. 
 
2.7 Competent to become competent 
One further issue that was necessary to ensure that the OAC model (McAleenan 
and McAleenan, 2001; 2002) would be successful thus ensuring that the worker-
centric approach would be properly embedded was to consider how competence 
was defined. In the traditional thinking competence was defined, as having skills, 
knowledge and experience. But that was a restrictive definition that ignored some 
fundamental requirements; namely resources and authority to make decisions. The 
author explored this (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2007; 2008), addressing the 
neutering effect of excluding the worker from safety decisions. Garavan (1997) 
noted that the Irish courts6 had also looked at the matter as far back as 1977, 
                                                 
6 Dalton v Frendo (1977), Irish Supreme Court Case, discussed in pps. 69-74, Garavan (1997) 
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where the Supreme Court, commenting on the qualities of a competent person, 
held that: 
“[having] due regard to the age, skill and experience of a worker, he or she 
will know the hazards associated with their work and be able to apply the 
controls necessary to prevent harm” 
Thus it was established that the ability to work safely is an integral aspect of 
competence and needs to be recognised as such in the execution of safe systems of 
working. There was widespread agreement that a competent worker is skilled, 
authoritative and in control of his work (ISSA, 2003; ILO, 2008; ANSI/AIHA, 
2005; McAleenan and McAleenan, 2008; Ayers and McAleenan, 2008).   
At CIB W099 in 2009 (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2009) the author introduced 
the concept of competent to become competent, where workers are recognised as 
having the capability to continuously extend the boundaries of their knowledge. 
The individual stands continuously as a contradiction in and off himself, both 
competent and not competent at the same time. At that point he may choose to 
remain sufficiently competent to maintain the status quo or he may wish to 
progress, broadening his experiences, acting on ever increasing challenges until he 
achieves excellence. Reaching the point where is he able to become competent in 
different and wider areas is the point where he is competent to become competent; 
capable of continuously extending the boundaries of his knowledge. Much in the 
same way as the OAC approach was about continuously reviewing and revising 
safety management in the organisation. The competent to become competent idea 
when aligned with the initial ideal of continuously challenging and improving 
upon the approaches to safety health and wellbeing completed the circle of 
originality that would see OAC, as a paradigm shift for construction safety, health 
and wellbeing mature. 
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Chapter 3. Methodology: A Critical Reflection 
 
3.1 Applying systems thinking to safety, health and wellbeing 
A discussion on research methods and approaches discussed in the books, papers 
and chapters [outputs] is continued in project specific chapters, as appropriate, 
where the aim, methodologies chosen and the conclusions reached is discussed. 
The research and related outputs demonstrated how the adaptation of a systems 
thinking approach could deliver significant improvements in workplace safety, 
health and wellbeing, while advancing the inherently safe[r] design debate within 
the civil engineering profession. The research methods followed in the 
development of the projects discussed in this thesis are varied and perhaps less 
than the conventional norm experienced in academic circles, however the majority 
of the work described is practice based. A retrospective critical analysis of the 
methods followed is presented below. 
Every research project begins with a question, often that question is ‘what if’; 
“what if there was a better way to…?” The author’s research was fuelled with a 
desire to critique that which existed as the accepted norm, to develop theories and 
practices that could give new insights. In that journey the author looked beyond 
traditional boundaries and brought alternative socially responsible educators and 
their educational tools to bear on a predominantly conservative industry, that was 
civil engineering and construction. The primary objective in the author’s work 
was to develop a new way of thinking in the field of occupational safety and 
health, with particular emphasis how workers could regain control of their safety, 
their learning, and their destiny. Semler (2003) instigator of a successful and 
revolutionary democratic workforce in Brazil in the 1980s held that 
“organizations must help workers indulge their interests and talents by seeking 
the same professional growth and satisfaction as musicians”. In order to achieve 
true workers involvement to the level suggested by Semler (2003) it was 
necessary to demonstrate how the application of dialogics and praxis develops 
critical conscientiousness (Freire 1970). In choosing and focussing on praxis as 
the guiding way forward in the delivery of a new paradigm in safety management 
the author is inclined towards Freire’s concern with action that was both informed 
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and linked to social values (Smith, 1997; 2002). Accepting that individuals have 
the intellectual capacity to know how to safely control their own workplace 
operations and that the development of that capacity is within an informed and 
socially responsible educational route. 
The focus of the author’s research and the portfolio presented centres on systems 
approach to management, specifically in safety, health and environmental fields, 
with an emphasis on linkages to lessons learnt from quality management. The 
majority of the work critiqued in this thesis has a professional practice basis. The 
author was, in the early days of the research, based entirely in professional 
practice, with the occasional venture into the academic world, however it is 
appropriate in this analysis to describe how the exemplar projects as described 
have developed within an academic framework. That said the research 
methodology most prominent would best be described as social constructivist, in 
so far as the creation of the model initially involved an element of linguistic 
analysis. For example, the discourse on risk management a failed paradigm 
(McAleenan and McAleenan, 2002, [Appendix 4]) explores and debunks the 
myths emanating from steadfast insistence that linguistic prescription take 
precedence over linguistic description. And in that the author’s critique moves 
through and between these opposing views. In other words, holding the belief that 
language exists to serve and not to be served turns the large majority of the 
analysis towards the very practical aspects; dialogics and praxis.  
 
3.2 Education: Value Engineering: Quality: Praxis 
The author explored the work of Juran (1986), Deming (1986) and Crosby (1979), 
reviewing it against international quality standards to compare with the safety, 
health and wellbeing regulatory requirements. In addition, the author introduced 
the relevance of dialogics to safety, health and wellbeing; that was how the past, 
or our perception of the past could be altered by the present as much as the present 
can be directed by the past. Ultimately the exploration focused on praxis; that is 
recognising the need to go beyond interpreting the world in various ways to the 
point where you change it (Marx 1845), and that in deciding in what way the 
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world is to be changed processes are set in motion that influence the future. Marx 
(1845) in Thesis III on Feuerbach explains;  
“The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or 
self-changing can be conceived and rationally understood only as 
revolutionary practice”.  
In examining the work of Aristotle (cited in Illich 1971), Marx (1845), Freire 
(1970), Illich (1971), the author distinguished the critical elements that allowed 
for a thorough comparison between quality and safety and established that rather 
than just a robust and practical link existing, there is a significant step forward, in 
that the praxis approach to OSH management developed though this analytical 
interpretation introduced ‘critical reflection’ as a central tenet of the model. It is 
necessary in reviewing progress to examine the point at which you have arrived, 
rather than the point from which you started before determining your next action. 
In other words life (or the world of work) is a constantly changing paradigm with 
every action shifting its position, therefore to reflect and act upon the 
circumstances that prevailed at some fixed point, as with quality is to fail to 
recognise this logic. In critiquing Freire’s praxis of pedagogy Pietrykowski (1996) 
interprets the praxis model thus; “Problem-posing education involves a constant 
unveiling of reality…[it] strives for the emergence of consciousness and critical 
intervention…”. Freire (1970) contends that the dialogical character of education 
begins when the teacher asks himself what his dialogue with the student will be 
about. In a follow up text Freire (1973), discussing education for critical 
consciousness, talked about educators having to think in terms of teacher-student 
and student-teacher; that is, a teacher who learns and a learner who teaches as the 
basic roles of classroom participation. Freire (1973) also insists that educator and 
student are not on an equal footing, but that the educator must be humble enough 
to be disposed to relearn that which he/she already thinks they know, through 
interaction with the learner. Education as a means of social praxis promotes 
dialogic learning, that is it requires both interpretation of the subject and 
judgement of its worth and meaning. Pietrykowski (1996), citing 
Habermas (1979) refers to this as communicative action, the rational desire to 
understand one another “…requiring that claims to truth, sincerity and legitimacy 
be accepted as part of the learning process”.   
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In a similar fashion to educational praxis models the design industry introduced 
value engineering, which asks how it is proposed to deliver a project and 
challenges the bona fides of the project, through asking why this is so. Value 
engineering is concerned with defining and identifying approaches that will 
ensure the achievement of best value solutions, executed in an organised and 
systematic manner to identify and eliminate any unnecessary cost. Describing the 
process as value management, Kelly and Male (1993); in an attempt to emphasise 
its broader management function, distinct from a pure technically driven solution 
finder refers to its capability to manage the evolution and development of a 
project from conception through to completion. Value engineering/ management 
is not, and should never be used as a cost cutting exercise neither should it be 
confused with a design review. It sets out to clearly define the client’s strategic 
objectives, considering the optimum design solutions within the context of the 
client’s business objectives and deciding which of these provides the optimum 
lifetime value to the client. 
The final output from a value engineering/ management exercise should be a 
solution or a range of solutions that are technically feasible and financially viable. 
Such an approach is firmly rooted in the quality frameworks espoused and 
practiced by Crosby (1979), Deming (1986) and Juran (1986). The Chartered 
Quality Institute (CQI 2012) describe quality in terms of both innovation and care; 
innovation in respect of the product or service as well as in the management of the 
process and care for all of the stakeholders and the environment. CQI (2012) 
argues that quality is an aspect of business that needs to be managed in order to 
identify any associated delivery risks, put in the controls and ensure the delivery 
of a sustainable product or service, reflecting the nature of quality in relation to 
societal responsibility. Therein lies the concept of quality management, moving 
industry away from inspections and statistical process control. The recognised 
experts in the field of quality management have long established the link between 
properly executed quality management procedures and the delivery of a quality 
product and in so doing developed variations of the praxis model, initially and 
specifically for manufacturing and production. Crosby’s (1979) belief in the 
achievement of zero defects, Deming’s (1986) Plan, Do, Check, Act and Juran’s 




3.3 Philosophy of Praxis 
Gramsci, in his Prison Notebooks in the 1930s (cited in Löwy7, 2011) used, for 
the first time, the expression a “philosophy of praxis”. The philosophy when 
practiced in workplace safety, health and wellbeing sets a standard far beyond the 
quality paradigm. That is that quality relied upon a rigid consistency of approach 
to deliver a pre-determined outcome (product or service), same way, same thing, 
every time. Where praxis has some similarities with Deming (1986), Juran (1986) 
and Crosby (1979) is in its adherence to planning and control, the essential 
difference, and what sets it apart is the critical reflection at each point along the 
way. Checking, reflecting that change has already taken place and the realising 
that the journey may also have changed. The rigidity within the quality models 
exposed their fixation with consistency of approach regardless of whether the 
direction was right, failing to contextualise with society other than as a 
commodity. Profit drove the changes and in that was the question, where did 
societal responsibility fit in the scheme?  
Dialogics on the other hand recognised society as an integral aspect of what is 
produced. It is not an abstract concept, rather it established that workers analyse 
the impact of the work on themselves, their colleagues and called upon them to 
consider the wider harm the work and/ or the product might have on society. 
Certainly within professional engineering ethics, societal responsibility was a 
fundamental principle. At the extreme the munitions worker, the tobacco 
plantation worker or the operative on the line at the cigarette factory all have a 
role in analysing the degree of harm they were likely to be exposed to, but what of 
the harmful effects of the end product? For them harm comes in many ways and 
protection of their livelihood would determine the abject meaning behind 
decisions they would have to make. This, as presented, suggested a sense of 
powerlessness in the workers, until through the praxis approach the workers could 
grasp the opportunity to recognise and address some of the dilemmas of 
competing objectives (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2010). Factory or plantation 
                                                 
7 Löwy (2011) was perceived by many as defining Marx as a worldview. 
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owners however did have a chance to explore the societal aspects of the praxis 
model. However, as the workers become more aware of, move toward greater 
understanding of and ultimately be in a position where they could take control of 
all their decisions; a ‘raising of consciousness’ then power could become more 
evenly distributed. The boss/ worker tell/ do attitudes could be eradicated from the 
world of work to be replaced with a more socially aware and responsible 
organisation; the essence of cultural maturity (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2009). 
 
3.4 Safety, Health and Wellbeing - The Praxis Approach 
McAleenan and McAleenan (1998), exploring the need for the industry to deal 
with the high degree of fatal incidents in confined spaces working began the 
process of modelling safety management, based on their earlier work in social 
action and on the well established praxis models in education, value engineering 
and quality. Exploring the merits of a Prevention-Appraisal-Failure (PAF), model 
ordinarily used to evaluate the cost of quality Juran and Gryna (1988), Crosby 
(1979) and McAleenan and McAleenan (2005) all assert that a higher investment 
in prevention will ultimately lead to reduced appraisal and failure costs. The 
ultimate aim being the ability to identify the optimum investment where cost of 
quality is at its minimum. There are as many variations in cost of quality models, 
as there are authors in the field, however Juran and Godfrey (1998) gave a good 
representation of the key points.  
The close similarities between quality management and the management of safety, 
health and wellbeing are such that systems alignment should have been inevitable. 
However, while some work was starting to emerge BSI (1996), Health and Safety 
Executive (1997) and DNV (1997) the linkages were still only at the conceptual 
stage in the late 1990s. OHSAS 18001:1999 (BSI 1999), although never achieving 
International, European or British Standard status, remains an acceptable safety 
management specification8, recognised by many countries and companies. It also 
                                                 
8 In October 2016 a new safety management systems standard (ISO 45001) is expected to be 
launched (International Organization for Standardization, 2015) 
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has clear correspondence with ISO 14001 (environmental management) and ISO 
9001 (quality management).  
Recognising the critical integration issues Eckenfelder (1996) reported that 
several chief executives of the largest U.S. companies had agreed that the 
influence of Deming (1986) had prompted them to ask more about the process 
than the ‘bottom line’. However, Eckenfelder (1996) also found that while most 
managers knew and spoke the language of quality and translated the text to the 
field of occupational safety and health few appeared to understand its 
connotations. As a consequence, the quality and safety message still appeared to 
be ‘surface level’ thinking in 1990s corporate America. McAleenan and 
McAleenan (1998) observed that the target for quality improvements in an 
organisation's safety performance must be to raise the standards and to reduce 
workplace accidents within specified timeframes. This, they hypothesised, is 
achievable through the use of techniques such as; safe working procedures (akin 
to quality procedures), risk assessments (akin to process control), and 
performance measurement (akin to control of non-conformance). The cost 
savings, in financial and human terms, will serve to engender an enthusiasm for 
improvement throughout the organisation, which should spread to other aspects of 
the business, thereby affirming the benefit to be gained from adopting costs of 
quality models as a means of achieving improved safety performance. There is a 
paradox of having to enthuse employers to engage with safety, health and 
wellbeing in economic terms, which is fostered in the risk management approach 
(McAleenan and McAleenan, 2002).  
In the development of OAC (McAleenan, 2001; 2002) the author used praxis as 
the defining model for safety management Praxis recognised and built upon the 
dialogic concept that work is both informed by and informs the actions to be taken 
(McAleenan and McAleenan, 2014). Through the embedding of critical reflection, 
problematising and conceptualising, an iterative approach, praxis allows the 
researcher, the practitioner and/ or the operative to explore widely and deeply the 
impact of and solution to any real world scenarios where harm would be present 




Figure 3.1: Praxis: Defining Model Managing Safety, Health and Wellbeing 
 
To problematise, for instance gave the opportunity to represent the activity, once 
defined, as a problem that needed to be resolved. Within the construction and civil 
engineering field problem solving; the desire to figure things out, is an inherent 
trait, alongside creativity and innovation. McAleenan (2015a) suggests:  
“Actively creative people have the ability to get to core of a problem, 
without becoming embroiled in the standards or the details.” 
Problematising, or the use of “creative licence” (McAleenan, 2015b; McAleenan 
and Behm, 2014; McAleenan and McAleenan, 2014) allows for the potential to 
‘think outside the box’, affording those involved in the OAC process the 
opportunity to consider less conventional ideas in the delivery of safe and healthy 
solutions. This approach, aligned with the philosophy of praxis (Gramsci, 1930 
cited in Löwy, 2011) led to the question; could the gains achieved through quality 
management and the respect it had got at Boardroom level be transferred to the 
management of safety, health and wellbeing with comparable degrees of success? 
For an acceptable answer there was needed to be an acknowledgement of and a 
nurturing of a vision zero approach as an inevitable consequence of the 
development of the management process for workplace safety health and 
wellbeing. An idea with strong affinity to Crosby’s (1979) zero defects focus and 
one that was further endorsed in the work of Flechler (2011) and Kellner (2011), 
presented at the World Congress on Safety and Health at Work. 
Success required leadership with a focus on a praxis approach to problematising 
and to solution delivery, resulting in the development of positive and dynamic 
management tools, accessible by and amenable to everyone in the workforce. 
McAleenan and McAleenan (1999) introduced the premise, “..technologically and 
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intellectually we have it within our capability to prevent fatal accidents from ever 
occurring in confined spaces” before going on to explore the vision zero concept. 
The theme strongly running through the observations recounted in McAleenan 
and McAleenan (1999) further validated the author’s hypothesis (McAleenan 
1998) that quality approaches and safety approaches needed to merge. This in turn 
would address causal factors and solutions that had a strong business focus. This 
kind of thinking was fundamentally an unfamiliar concept for UK safety 
professionals to grasp in the late 1990s, although Ibbetson’s work in Canada, at 
the same time, was introducing similar ideas from a communications perspective 
(Ibbetson, 1998). 
 
3.5 Critical theory, critical consciousness and linguistic analysis 
As the work progressed and the ideas were developing the author’s next step was 
to delve more deeply into the language of safety, the ideological barriers being 
created through the misuse and misinterpretation that for the industry and the 
profession had become commonplace. In a very real sense the approach was to get 
behind the language in use to reveal the true intent and through a process of 
deconstruction and reconstruction of the language help the industry redefine its 
purpose. Critical theory largely used in philosophy and social science was an 
appropriate avenue for the author’s work as the OAC model was developing to its 
full potential as much as it was an appropriate method to employ in redefining the 
scholarly work within the emerging PtD education and training programme. The 
work of Sherratt (2012), described as social constructivism is the closest 
alignment in construction safety, health and wellbeing research. Albeit that where 
social constructivism might go far enough to identify the ideologies existing 
within the industry, critical theory goes further with deeper analysis into why the 
ideologies exist and where they might lead before proposing a way forward. The 
critical theory approach does not seek to change ideologies, but to understand 
from where they have come and in presenting alternative workplace safety, health 
and wellbeing solutions allow the audience to make the transition through 
informed choice. This was behind the conscientization (Freire 1970) or critical 
consciousness approach to the development of both OAC and the PtD education 
and instruction programmes. Freire’s use of the term critical consciousness rested 
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in the idea of a quality that is essential to one's personal and collective identity 
while Mustakova-Possardt (2003) suggests that Freire’s (1970) critical 
conscientiousness approach demands “critical thinking, an understanding of 
causality, a grasp of the processes of history, and the ability to translate thought 
into action”. It was that which the author sought to achieve in construction 
workers, designers and the safety practitioner community. Related to all of this is 
critical pedagogy, involving the process of unlearning, relearning through critical 
analysis, reflection, evaluation and synthesis and as a consequence deconstructing 
and reconstructing the language of safety. 
In the conduct of the research and development for both of the exemplar projects 
the extent of linguistic analysis had a focus on specific terms and terminology. 
This was not so much an academic exercise in exposing the wrongness of those 
using the language in its common everyday use, for in the early days and in the 
first iterations of OAC the author too had used the same language. Rather the 
purpose was to expose the consequences of the incorrect use of the language, no 
matter how innocent the misuse was and through critical consciousness approach 
allow practitioners to achieve a deeper understanding of the world, through 
exposure to the inherent contradictions in the then widely accepted approach to 
safety, health and wellbeing.  
What became clear in the early 2000s (McAleenan and McAleenan 2001, 2002 
and 2004) was that the ideological and firmly routed stance adopted by the 
majority of the safety and health professionals with regards to ‘risk management’ 
was in fact a barrier to achieving the zero harm objective and sat at odds with the 
OAC model. Not that it was ever felt that the intentions of practitioners was to do 
harm, rather the inappropriate use of language was creating a false belief that 
vision zero was a dream too far away from reality to ever come true, supported in 
IOSH (2004), McAleenan and McAleenan (2005), McAleenan and McAleenan 
(2007), McAleenan and McAleenan (2008), Ayers and McAleenan (2008). 
Viner’s work, cited in Ayers (2010) supports the notion that “…there is a body of 
anecdotal and academic evidence, which supports the idea that people at risk 
often have very limited perception about what can be changed in their work 
environment to improve their health and safety”. What had surfaced in the 
author’s own critical reflection of the developing OAC model was a well-defined 
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need to deconstruct the existing language and reconstruct it with a more positive, 
forward thinking outlook. 
While critiquing the term ‘risk management’, in an effort to present an alternative 
way of thinking, the primary argument was one of the conflating of two mutually 
exclusive words, ‘risk’ meaning chance and management meaning to ‘control’. 
The descriptive grammarian would accept that the meaning and intent behind the 
term was sufficiently clear and consequently the term could stand in its common 
use, whereas the prescriptive grammarian approach would be to recognise the 
fatal flaw inherent in the conflation thereby rendering the term inappropriate at the 
very least. However any critical evaluation of the language of safety cannot be a 
purely academic exercise, rather in the highlighting of such anomalies in the 
language the purpose was to explore the very real possibility that critical 
conscientiousness can be wanting and consequently injuries might prevail. To 
simply look at each word in isolation and critique it would have been a superficial 
analysis, since there was more behind the emergence of the term ‘risk 
management’ in the field of workplace safety health and wellbeing. The 
introduction of human loss into a field where prioritising loss control is its 
primary function is an objectionable act in as much as worker’s harm becomes a 
tradable commodity in an ever-constant resources struggle. The safety 
professional’s desire to gain influence at Boardroom level was a critical factor in 
their adoption of quasi-business vernacular. Supplanting ‘safety management’ (the 
correct term) with ‘risk management’ may have appeared innocent enough, after 
all safety people talk about risk too. The developing role of the safety 
professional, defined in the new (EU inspired) regulations in the 1990s [another 
misinterpretation]9 was to manage. Put the terms together and you have the key to 
                                                 
9  The requirement in The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 
[Regulation 7] are that “Every employer shall, subject to paragraphs (6) and (7), appoint one or 
more competent persons to assist him in undertaking the measures he needs to take to comply with 
the requirements and prohibitions imposed upon him by or under the relevant statutory 
provisions…”. Competent person is not necessarily the company safety person, since competent 
assistance may come more appropriately from an expert in a very specific field; for example, a 
structural engineer or a geotechnical engineer, expertise beyond that of the generalist safety and 
health practitioner (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2004).   
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the Boardroom.  
However, without critical reflection there was a failure to understand that ‘risk 
management’ was about insurance and financial loss control, not human loss.  
In furtherance of the critical theory approach and staying with the linguistic 
challenges there was the question of whether sociolinguistics as opposed to the 
sociology of language was most applicable; the former exploring the effect 
society has on the language and the latter examining the effect that language has 
on society. Citing Gergen and Gergen (2004) and Crowther and Green (2006), 
Sherratt (2012) indicated that “social constructionism sees the world as socially 
constructed by the people within it through their everyday interactions and 
practices” yet in her discourse analysis Sherratt (2012) found that every day 
language of safety often still boils down to artefacts, rules and enforcement. None 
of which are overly helpful in engaging workers in the process of construction 
safety management. The debate clearly needs more time to run and/ or more 
actively engaged players. The critical evaluation of the language in use at the time 
the OAC and the PtD education and instruction projects were emerging and its 
effects had its roots in pragmatism. In as much as the words, their meanings and 
their use must have a clear context and in this regard an appropriate audience.  
The engaging of workers at every appropriate level was fundamental to success of 
any management system since ‘buy in’ comes more readily when the persons 
concerned sees the need and are involved in creating the solutions. The total 
involvement of the worker was fundamental, not only in social wellbeing context 
but in the sense of being an integral aspect of the business. Semler (2003) 
asserted; “Organizations must help workers indulge their interests and talents” 
and went on to say, “By letting people off the hook of grand policies, procedures 
and rules, we release them to be accountable…”. Famed for his radical views on 
developing his company Semler (1993) believed in relinquishing central control to 
the workers and in providing information and resources that allowed workers 
autonomy in the delivery of product. Robens (1972) indicated that “...must be 
able to participate fully in the making and monitoring of arrangements for safety 
and health at their place of work...” a notion cited in and explored further in 
McAleenan and McAleenan (2011) where it is argued that the unnecessary 
influences of 3rd parties (safety advisory officers) neuter the competence of 
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workers who should otherwise be fully engaged in the process. Ayers (2011) 
explored this more deeply, arguing that “the legislative requirement to consult 
does not in itself guarantee the quality, richness, depth” or indeed existence of 
true worker involvement in active safety management.  
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Chapter 4. Project 1: The Operation Analysis and Control Model 
 
4.1 Aim and Objectives for the OAC Project 
Aim: To demonstrate how the application of dialogics develops worker’s critical 
conscientiousness, aiding the intellectual capacity to know how to safely control 
workplace operations. 
Objective 1:  Development a strategic safety, health and wellbeing (OAC) model 
focused on operational control across different workplace activities. 
Objective 2:  Redefine the competence required to execute the OAC model. 
Objective 3: Test the reliability, validity of the OAC model. 
Objective 4: Measure the relevance and impact of the application of the OAC 
model. 
 
4.2 Motivation for the development of OAC 
If quality and safety are inextricably linked, McAleenan (1998), McAleenan and 
Orr (1999), McAleenan and McAleenan (2002), McAleenan and McAleenan 2005 
and Gunning and McAleenan (2010) what then are the consequences for hazard 
control in an enlightened and progressive construction company? That is to say 
one that seeks to go beyond legal compliance, holding to the prevention/ vision 
zero beliefs espoused in the Seoul Declaration (ILO 2008). The Seoul Declaration 
(ILO 2008) added further weight to the discourse when it stated “...the right to a 
safe workplace should be recognised as a fundamental human right”, making 
worker safety and health a ‘rights’ issue linking it firmly with the United Nations 
Declaration on Human Rights; UDHR 50 (1998), McAleenan and McAleenan 
(2005).  
The successful implementation of the OAC model into the workplace required 
control, of the task or the work operation, not the worker (McAleenan and 
McAleenan 2010). Truly successful implementation will be brought about when 
the worker has the autonomy to control his own work operation, equipped with 
the necessary competence, resources and authority (McAleenan and McAleenan, 
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2007; 2008). This attitude gave the worker an ability to read a situation, establish 
the sources of harm, identify the appropriate controls and ask the 'what if' 
questions.  
Project 1, the development of the OAC model (Figure 4.1) for safety, health and 
wellbeing (McAleenan, 2001; 2002), took full cognisance of the quality into 
safety ideas that were emerging in the late 1990s. Although still in their infancy 
there was a need to critically reflect upon the established order, since the accident 
and ill-health rates were not decreasing as they should have (Health and Safety 
Executive 2015a and 2015b).  The nature and type of control and the merits of 
operation control as compared to strategic control models; focused on the now, 
addressing the internal factors and guided by external factors would deliver a 
model that straddled both the operational and strategic perspectives thereby 
ensuring a worker-centric, business focused approach to managing safety, health 
and wellbeing.  
 




Defining a new paradigm for operation analysis and control, the objective being to 
‘tap into’ the quality agenda and find common grounds where safety and quality 
become intertwined and an integral aspect of how business gets done. The true 
quality/ safety mix of systems development has workers at its heart with 
management fully supporting its delivery. A successful approach will see a 
worker driven collaboration with management that delivers real safety 
improvements across the whole of the workplace. Further embodiment of the 
quality/ safety systems approach should extend to designers of the management 
systems and procedures as well as the technical/ engineering designs of structures. 
In this strategy healthy and safe by design had two aspects to it. The first being 
the design of structures, plant and substances and in that regard the following 
would be considered essential:  
 A thorough knowledge of the design processes and principles, together with;  
 A sound knowledge of the means of production (or construction);  
 Sound knowledge of how the product/ structure is to be used; and  
 Knowledge of eventual disposal/ demolition methods.  
In that way the designer fulfils a professional and ethical responsibility to provide 
a safe product/ structure design that will not present harm to anyone using or 
affected by its use at any stage in the life-cycle. In the second aspect healthy and 
safe by design referred to designing work processes and systems of work, and as 
such does not specifically refer to the design professional. Design in this regard 
relied upon those most familiar with and most affected by the work processes. The 
list of people involved would vary and had to be specific to the work process. The 
primary requirement for inclusion to the list was knowledge of the work process. 
That list included, among others:  
 The workers; 
 The supervisors; 
 The managers (production, operations, finance etc.); and 
 Competent advisors (such as; safety and health professionals, subject 




Risk management identified what are deemed to be potential risks in an operation 
or activity; followed by a determination of how likely it was that workers might 
be exposed to the hazard(s) and with what consequences. There was an element of 
the educated guess involved in that process and certainly in the late 1990s the 
assessment process rarely included the perspective or experience of the person 
exposed to the hazard(s).  
Risk management had a historical link to insurance and financial loss control, 
however human loss could not be automatically placed in the same loss control 
model. Financial risk management looked for the level of loss below which 
financial stability would be affected and recovery was in jeopardy. Human loss, 
on the other hand is absolute and not recoverable, accordingly a different 
approach, operation analysis and control (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2001; 
2002) was called for. An approach that started further back in the work process at 
a point where human loss was not an option and where the entire operation could 
be explored and safe solutions identified before any possible harm was realised.  
OAC analysed the entire operation, in consultation with the workers, an idea 
advocated by Robens (1972), Ayers and McAleenan (2008) and Ayers (2011), 
which worked to identify the whole gamut of hazards inherent in the operation. 
Having worked out all of the interactions between the hazards the next stage was 
to put forward workable controls that would ensure that the operation was safe to 
start, safe to execute and safe to complete. All avenues, safety, health and 
wellbeing were to be included in the analysis. This new paradigm (OAC) 
recognised the central role a competent worker (McAleenan and McAleenan 
2007; 2008) had to play in maintaining safe workplaces. It was not appropriate 
that workers remain as bit players or worse still play no role at all. Workers’ 
competence in delivering the work activity should never be understated nor 
underestimated. To reiterate, a major issue with designing work processes is 
essentially one of competence, and by that the author considered competence in 
its truest sense. Not just knowledge, skills and experience as was the often-quoted 
definition. Additionally, competence meant having the resources to complete the 
task with safety, health and wellbeing appropriately addressed and having the 
authority to make the decisions within the workers’ sphere of control and 
influence (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2010). What that meant was that all 
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stakeholders (workers, supervisors and managers) had to be fully engaged and 
participate in the process of designing a safe work process. So many times 3rd 
parties became involved and took over, effectively neutering the intellectual 
capability of those most allied to the work itself. In those circumstances mistakes 
or misunderstandings were a real possibility along with a reluctance to comply 
from those who knew 'better' ways of successfully executing the work process. In 
that sense 'design error' almost certainly crept into the process. OAC was about 
involving and listening to the people who knew the job best when working 
towards a comprehensive, prevention orientated work process. Notwithstanding 
those comments there could be a role for 3rd party involvement, providing it was 
in the sense of an expert advisor, helping the main competent people come up 
with a good, business friendly, safe and healthy work process. The OAC model 
developed presented a new paradigm for safety, health and wellbeing (and 
ultimately environmental management), which presented innovative prevention 
practices that work across industries and across national boundaries.  
 
4.3 Justification for the OAC model 
At the time the need for a break away from the risk management approach was 
becoming compelling (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2002). In March 2001 the 
author initiated a discussion within the safety profession using the Institution of 
Occupational Safety and Health (IOSH) online discussion board. The purpose of 
that critical discourse (Appendix 4) was to engage the key members of the safety 
profession in a critique of their chosen positions. The subject ‘Risk management – 
A Failed Paradigm’ was deliberately polemical to engage as many as possible in 
the debate. The author concluded there was sufficient evidence that while the 
intent behind the language was the driving force for the necessary societal 
changes the language of risk management, had led practitioners into indefensible 
positions of accepting that a degree of harm was inevitable in the workplace and 
beyond. In a discussion on corporate governance at the World Congress on 
Occupational safety and Health (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2008) argued the 
conventions and rules that direct the relationships between all the stakeholders 
had to ensure that any structures and procedures effectively achieve growth and 
stability while maintaining the integrity of the organisation and its stakeholders.  
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However, the definition and intent held within the safety profession at that time 
when taken at face value appeared to exhibit ignorance of the dialectic that 
governed the working out of the contradictions inherent in the differing spheres of 
influence within an organisation and its social milieu.  This in turn impacted upon 
the organisation’s efficacy in creating the correct conditions for achieving growth 
and stability. 
Legislation; initially the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (OPSI, 1974) 
and laterally that which emanated from EU Directives (i.e. The Management of 
Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999), required the identification and 
evaluation of risk. There was no specific requirement to risk manage 10  in 
legislation, although common usage of the risk management term appears to stem 
from loss control in the insurance industry, spreading without full due diligence 
into the world of workplace safety and health. ILO (1999) refers to risk 
assessment and the need for OSH management, perhaps the conflation of the two 
terms coupled with the linkage back to insurance risk had resulted in the 
inappropriately named risk management in safety health and wellbeing. 
McAleenan and McAleenan (2015) set out to explore the numbers behind the risk 
assessment assertions to determine the validity or otherwise of the approach. The 
existence of the safety professional exposed some of the contradictions that 
pervade the issue of effective governance, in particular when, as a function of 
management, that role conflicts with the notion that the competent company is 
composed of proficient decision making employees. Here lies the contradiction; a 
dichotomy had been created whereby safety had become separated from and 
transformed into an adjunct to a task where once it had been an integral aspect of 
competent worker performance.  As an adjunct it was susceptible to “bottom line” 
thinking where the “unnecessary” is jettisoned in the face of dwindling 
profitability, and held onto only to the extent that legal minimums are met.  
Maharaj (2008) argued that the organisation that took the reactive problem-
                                                 
10 The origin of current safety and risk-management concepts can be traced to the need to master 
the extremely high hazards inherent to the use of nuclear energy. Background information can be 
found at the web sites of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), at www.iaea.org, and 
the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), at www.nea.fr. 
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solving approach to safety generally had a perception that safety issues were 
divorced from day-to-day business operations and consequently they were sub-
ordinate to the demand on thee time of senior management. 
 
4.4 Validation of the model - OAC in Practice 
The operation analysis and control (OAC) model had been designed to ensure that 
work operations would be carried out in strict accordance with all relevant ‘safe 
working’ procedures. In that way people, plant and property would be protected 
from harm prior to, during and after the work operation, regardless of the nature 
of the hazards faced. The earliest iteration of the OAC model (Appendix 2) 
integrated all aspects of the work operation, addressing safety, health and 
wellbeing matters at each stage. OAC went through a number of iterations, the 
original being more closely aligned to the conventional Risk Assessment/ ‘Plan, 
Do, Check, Act’ approach (Health and Safety Executive, 1997) in HS(G)65. 
However, HSE had also moved forward in their thinking (Health and Safety 
Executive 2013) when they said: 
“Truly effective health and safety management requires competency across 
every facet of an organisation and through every level of 
the workforce”.   
The basic premise had remained and that is that operations should be safely 
designed and executed. With that the safe and healthy ‘from conception’ to ‘final 
execution’ approach had arrived in the world of safety management. Later 
versions of OAC, including the most recent 11  (Appendix 2) had a more 
simplified, although not simplistic approach reflective of a much more pragmatic 
attitude. The stages were clearer and the questions much more focused and direct. 
OAC was first introduced to a Northern Ireland government agency with 
approximately 2,000 employees in 1997 (McAleenan and Orr, 1999). At the time 
the Agency had six Safety Advisory Officers and a Senior Safety Advisor, 
                                                 
11 The current OAC model (McAleenan 2015) is a cosmetic change only from the 2002 version. 
The 3 stages are presented in detail in Appendix 2 
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hundreds of risk assessments in various stages of readiness and a safety manual 
that resembled a paper mountain. A widely held feeling, at that time, was that 
everything relating to safety, health and wellbeing could be left in the capable 
hands of the ‘safety guys’, the inference being that they alone had responsibility 
for ensuring safe and healthy working conditions for their 2000 colleagues. 
Perhaps this notion stemmed, in part, from Robens (1972) who, while 
acknowledging the managers’ direct operational responsibility for safety and 
health also discussed the possibility of specialist safety advisors sitting within the 
line management chain, in much the same way as personnel officers did. While 
this notion didn’t find its way through to legislation [HSWA, 1974] it nonetheless 
remained widely held across industry and within the safety professional fraternity. 
However, the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (and 
the previous 1992 version of the Regulations) gave effect to Council Directive 
89/391/EEC in UK and made clear, what was implicit in Health and Safety at 
Work etc. Act 1974 (OPSI, 1974) was that employers are to appoint competent 
persons to: 
“...assist him in undertaking the measures he needs to take to comply with 
the requirements and prohibitions imposed upon him by or under the 
relevant statutory provisions...”  
Unfortunately, competence and expertise are often conflated. Whereas 
occasionally specific expertise may be needed to solve a particular matter the 
routine operation analysis and control is well left in the capable hands of 
competent operatives and managers. The relevant point being that there was a 
requirement for the use of ‘competent person[s]’ to assist, not safety officer[s]/ 
advisor[s] as discussed in Robens (1972) and McAleenan and McAleenan (2007; 
2008). The changing emphasis for the Northern Ireland government agency, post 
1997, was an acknowledgement that all its employees, from members of the 
Board to operatives out on the ground each had capability, resources and the 
responsibility to ensure safe and healthy working conditions within their sphere of 
control and influence. To make this transition as smooth as possible the existing 
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group of safety advisors was gradually reduced in numbers, each one assuming a 
more appropriate role of providing technical assistance when requested by 
management and staff until eventually when the transition to OAC was completed 
the safety advisors were totally phased out. Two requirements had been central to 
the success of the approach. Firstly, the Board defined their priorities with health 
and safety integral to their business strategy and secondly they accepted that 
competence is an essential attribute for all of their employees; noting that 
competence extended to having adequate resources, responsibility to achieve and 
the authority to act within their sphere of control.  
When introducing the OAC approach, the then Chief Executive (McCoubrey, 
1998) indicated that in the first 5-year period the organisation would consider a 
10% year on year reduction in lost time accidents as an acceptable and achievable 
target, forecasting that a £1.1m saving was to be realised in the process. What 
transpired was a 20% year on year reduction, dropping from 68 to 22 (Table 4.1. 
In the first 5 years of operating OAC (up to 2003/04) the lost-time accident levels 
for the Northern Ireland government agency fell by over 68% (McAleenan and 
McAleenan, 2005). Over the years that followed the Board of Directors set new 
and more challenging lost-time accident reduction targets (Table 5.1).  
 


















































































In Year 68 50 34 41 39 22 22 25 23 - 
3 year Average 56 55 50 42 38 34 28 23 23 - 
Board’s Target        49    41   36   19 
 
The resultant reduction in the reportable accident rate was more than double the 
performance target set by the Chief Executive Officer at the time of the OAC 
models introduction. The OAC approach was audited, using traditional audit 
techniques each year since it’s introduction where compliance rates of 85% to 
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95% was found to be not uncommon, a testament to the acceptance of the 
approach across the organisation (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2005).  
 
4.5 Examples of OAC in use 
Eighteen years since it was first developed and put into practice companies using 
the OAC model (Appendix 2) or elements of it examine the requirements 
necessary for successful and therefore safe and healthy outcomes and ensure that 
the resources; human, material and financial, are in place to control their 
operations. The OAC approach is expandable from simple everyday tasks to the 
comprehensive task of governing the organisation.  
The Institution of Highways and Transportation published highways 
environmental management model (McAleenan, 1998), based on the first iteration 
of OAC and in 2014 ASSE published an environmental management model, 
based on the most recent OAC iteration (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2014).  
In 2002 a multinational food manufacturer invited the author to carry out a review 
of the degree of their compliance with the CoSHH12 requirements. The purpose of 
the review was to make a determination of the extent to which the company had 
assessed and controlled the use of hazardous substances (including carcinogens 
and biological agents) in compliance with the statutory requirements. The results 
of which would guide the development of a Chemicals Safety Analysis and 
Control procedure, an OAC specialist iteration, which would integrate into the 
company’s Task Risk Analysis (TRA) procedures. Following a preliminary 
meeting in December 2002 a gap analysis approach was agreed upon and relevant 
documentation developed and produced. The exercise was not a full compliance 
audit. In May 2003 an on-site observation and review of procedures took place as 
well as detailed an examination of samples from relevant documentation and 
materials. Ultimately it was important that the company be aware of their own 
duty to develop CoSHH and/ or Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) 
documentation in respect of any new substance created as a by-product of any of 
                                                 
12 CoSHH – Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 2002. 
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their processes. In 2012 (Maharaj, McAleenan and McAleenan, 2012) the OAC 
was introduced to nuclear new build industry in the operation training manual 
ahead of the beginnings of the building of Britain’s new nuclear programme. 
OAC acknowledges that each functional role within an organisation had a sphere 
of control and a sphere of influence. Its effective integration into the workplace 
requires that workers, at all levels, are allowed the freedom to deliver on their 
functional responsibility, with a degree of autonomy synonymous with their 
defined role in the organisation. Elsewhere in Australia Ayers (2010) has 
suggested that: 
“We should be asking ourselves - what can possibly go wrong and 
what can we, as an industry, do to prevent it from going wrong.  Then 





Chapter 5. Project 2: Prevention through Design Education 
 
5.1 Aim and Objectives for the PtD Education Project 
Aim: To produce the education packages that will develop engineers’ capability 
to deliver vision zero through the application of inherently safe[r] design 
principles and practices. 
Objective 1:  Adopt and adapt inherently safer design principles from chemical 
processing for use in civil engineering design. 
Objective 2: Develop a designer training package that embodies the principle 
that designs should be capable of being built, used, maintained and eventually 
demolished safely. 
Objective 3: Integrate PtD theories and practice into undergraduate degree 
programme. 
Objective 4: Test the reliability, validity of the developed PtD resources. 
 
5.2 PtD: Motivation behind the approach 
How can designers’ competence be developed and used in a meaningful and 
beneficial way to ensure the development of inherently safe[r] designs and the 
delivery of the objective that designs should be such that they can be built, used, 
maintained and eventually demolished safely. Since that responsibility lies 
initially and primarily with designers the aspiring engineer’s journey to 
independence of thought and action requires the provision of practical information 
about safe design principles. The UK Work and Pensions Committee (WPC, 
2008) suggested the need to rationalise safety and health education and training, 
placing it within the competencies of those responsible for the health, safety and 
welfare of workers and consumers and thus on the syllabi of all courses and 
programmes of professional and vocational study.  
In Québec, at the 2nd international seminar on occupational safety and health 
education and training this was recognised as a necessity by the International 
Social Security Association (ISSA, 2003). The Québec Protocol (ISSA, 2003) 
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placed an onus on educational bodies and the institutions responsible for the 
prevention of industrial accidents and occupational diseases to ensure that safety, 
health and wellbeing was incorporated into the educational processes of all 
occupations, that mastery of the requisite safety, health and wellbeing knowledge 
and practice are a focus of evaluation and that the education bodies adopt 
exemplar practices as well as polices and rules. In the UK the Joint Board of 
Moderators (JBM) has determined that graduating engineers must demonstrate 
attitude, knowledge and a degree of competence particularly with reference to 
health and safety (JBM, 2011). A fully functioning professional design engineer 
must be in a position to demonstrate that they have sound knowledge of scientific, 
engineering and technical principles, experience of construction processes and 
knowledge that extends to future use, maintenance and demolition (McAleenan 
and McAleenan, 2010). 
In the various life cycles of the construction industry designers’ play a pivotal role 
in ensuring the development of inherently safe[r] designs. Behind any 
construction project there are fundamental principles that are universally 
applicable and which the designers must keep to the fore, not least of which were 
the requirements to eliminate or reduce the impact of hazards that might arise 
during construction work. Since the earliest design decisions can fundamentally 
affect safety, health and wellbeing early intervention are called for to ensure that 
all of the necessary safety and health issues have been appropriately addressed. 
And it is for this reason, outwith the various pronouncements (ISSA, 2003; WPC, 
2008, Donaghy, 2009; JBM, 2011) that a didactic response to the embedding of 
PtD thinking in the professional design engineer was essential.  
The act of “prevention” is derived from both the common law and statutory duties 
of care that, in specific relationships we are obligated to act in a manner that will 
not cause harm to others, whether by design or through negligence. As far back as 
1955 the US National Safety Council (NSC, 1955) suggested that design 
engineers should consider the need to have safety built into every aspect of 
production. While this may have been the early thinking that would lead to 
prevention through design principles it hadn’t gone far enough in not addressing 
the need to consider long-term use, maintenance and eventual demolition. The 
International Labour Organisation (2004) contended that it had never accepted the 
 TOC 
61 
notion that injury and disease “go with the job”, arguing that prevention worked. 
Article 1 of the Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and Health 
Convention (ILO, 2006) states that the: 
“…term a national preventative safety and health culture refers to a 
culture in which the right to a safe and healthy working environment is 
respected at all levels, where government, employers and workers actively 
participate…through a system of defined rights, responsibilities and duties, 
and where the principle of prevention is accorded the highest priority.” 
This was reiterated in the Seoul Declaration (ILO, 2008) and even though the 
preventative culture argument was gaining momentum prevention through design 
as a concept wasn’t yet in vogue. 1994 saw the introduction of the first version of 
the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations (CDM); UK’s response 
to the EU Directive 92/57/EEC temporary or mobile construction sites 
(EUOSHA, 2015b). Which, while not being explicit was paving the way for what 
would become the prevention through design approach. The essential safety 
requirement (OPSI, 1974) required that a manufacturer take responsibility to 
ensure that their products are safe from harming workers and those who ultimately 
use their products. In that regard it is implied that those who design the product 
must consider the impact and implications of their designs on those who come 
into contact with the finished product as well as those involved in the production 
process. There is nothing new in the idea that those who design and construct a 
building should be held accountable for any failings in their design that leads to 
injury to another. Lawmakers have been developing regulations that were not 
about supporting this as established practice, but rather were about compelling 
designers to adopt the practice, (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2009).  
Looking internationally, in Australia for example, three jurisdictions (Western 
Australia, Queensland and South Australia) have statutes that oblige designers to 
address safety with a fourth, New South Wales, requiring safety through design on 
public works projects over $1m. (Gambatese et al, 2009) and in the UK the CDM 
regulations 2007 (updated in GB in 2015) imposed similar duties on designers. 
The regulatory compulsion to design safety in does not automatically translate to a 
requirement to include safety, health and wellbeing education and training as a 
compulsory component of engineering education. Donaghy (2009) recommended: 
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“…there should be a review by the Higher Education Funding 
Council…the industry and professional bodies on the adequacy and 
relevance of university or college curricula in covering design, health and 
safety awareness and risk management issues”. 
Additionally, and without regard to legal obligations professional bodies, such as 
the ICE, have always held that it is a professional and ethical responsibility for 
members of the learned society to deliver safe and healthful products. Moving 
forward it was at the HSE consultation (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2005) into 
the revision of the CDM regulations when HSE started to recognise PtD as a core 
tenet of construction safety when they indicated:  
“…designers are in a unique position to eliminate or reduce the risks that 
arise during construction work and have a key role to play in the design 
and management of construction projects”.  
Ultimately in the revised legislation (Health and Safety Executive, 2007) the need 
for designers to consider the safety, health and wellbeing of maintenance and 
demolition workers arrived at the forefront of regulatory requirements. 
Designers and constructors are the two essential roles in any construction project 
that, between them, must possess the necessary competence and skills to 
successfully and safely realise their client’s vision. The project will not be 
successfully delivered unless the two parties (designer and constructor) in tandem 
with the Client, properly co-ordinate their activities, communicate their 
requirements and co-operate in the delivery of the project. The design safety 
analysis and control process (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2004), derived from 
the Operation Analysis and Control (OAC) model integrated all aspects of the 
project process including those associated with the design elements in 
construction. Underpinning this approach to safety is the elimination of risk 
through the absolute control of all stages of the process.  
The model suited the requirements of European Council Directive 92/57/EEC on 
the implementation of minimum safety and health requirements at temporary or 
mobile construction sites with particular reference to project preparation. Since 
CDM 1994 there has been a principal contractor with responsibility to co-ordinate 
all aspects of the construction phase it should stand to reason that the design phase 
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of the project should also have a principal with specific responsibility to co-
ordinate all aspects of the design of the project, extending into overseeing its 
successful construction (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2004). CDM could easily 
have placed a duty on principal designers and principal contractors to co-ordinate 
safety and health issues, communicate relevant or significant findings and to co-
operate with each other to ensure a safe and healthy outcome. This would meet 
the spirit of the Temporary and Mobile Workers Directive, remove any 
unnecessary bureaucracy presented by the addition of a separate co-ordinator and 
ensure that control and influence of the designer and constructor are not neutered. 
The author’s ideas are now reflected in the 2015 version of the CDM regulations 
in GB.  
 
5.3 PtD: The Educational Challenge 
Students develop their competence through active participation in a variety of 
learning settings, both formal and informal, therefore it is for educators and 
mentors to assist students comprehend the importance of designing safe products, 
buildings, processes and systems. The challenge with the introduction of the 
construction design and management regulatory requirements introduced first in 
GB in 1994 was the dissemination of the appropriate information to all of the 
relevant players in construction. Indeed, identifying who all the players were was 
an immediate challenge before deciding on a range of educational training 
delivery modes. In addressing the fundamentals behind the range of educational 
and instructional programmes (design and delivery) the author was mindful of 
Dearing’s (1996) suggestion that lifelong learning points to the need for higher 
education to be increasingly responsive to the needs of students and to be explicit 
about what it is providing through learning programmes, and their expected 
outcomes. Education must never be about what is contained in the book (Swamy, 
2005), or in the head of the educator. It has to be experiential and lifelong. 
Cognisance was also taken of the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) for Higher 
Education’s Framework for Higher Education Qualifications (2008); developed 
and maintained by QAA in response to the Dearing recommendations, which 
required that “When designing and approving programmes, higher education 
providers will wish to ensure that a coherent learning experience is delivered”. 
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Additionally, Vivekananda (cited in Swamy 2005) stated; “Education means that 
process which character is formed, strength of mind is increased and intellect is 
sharpened. As a result of which one can stand on one’s own feet”. Mao Tse 
Tung’s treatise (cited in Freire, 1972) resonates as much with education 
philosophy as it does within the world of work: 
“All work done for the masses must start from their needs and not from the 
desire of any individual, however well intentioned...We should not make 
the change until, through our work, most of the masses have become 
conscious of the need and are willing and determined to carry it out.” 
This suggests that the students have to be ready for and see the need for the 
changes else they will remain unresponsive to them and all efforts will at the 
least have been misplaced and at the worst have been lost. Mao’s sentiments 
are recognised in the writings of Marton (1981), quoted in Biggs and Tang 
(2003) when he reintroduced the term ‘phenomenography’ to describe that the 
students’ perspective determines what is learnt and not specifically what the 
teacher intends the learning outcome to be. Phillips (2009) cites and praises 
the ASSE’s championing of the ExCEED (Excellence in Civil Engineering 
Education) programme in its approach to improving the teaching capabilities 
in order to considerably enhance the students learning experience. Stacey, 
Simpson and Schleyer (2009) discussed the means for ensuring that “...safety-
critical professionals received adequate education in health and safety risk 
management”, citing Lord Cullen at the Hatfield Rail Enquiry:  
“Education of engineers should deliver professionals who understand their 
professional responsibilities for the safety of the public, including the need 
to act on safety critical defects…”. 
Education theories and models developed in the 1960s and 1970s resonated in 
a number of the cases studied with varying degrees of success in imbedding 
safety, health and wellbeing awareness and competence in graduating 
engineers. There is no absolute, no one solution that stands head and shoulders 
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above the rest proclaiming that this is the way forward (McAleenan and 
McAleenan, 2010). 
 
5.4 Cognitive Learning and Constructive Alignment 
In the foreword to EUOSHA’s document of mainstreaming OSH into university 
education (Copsey, 2010) the Director states, “...if OSH is truly to become an 
integral part of business management in all sizes of organisations then all future 
managers and professionals need relevant [risk] education, not just those who 
work in high risk13 sectors”. Copsey (2010) describe 36 good practice example 
cases across the European Union where OSH education has been embedded in the 
curriculum. Central to the design of the PtD educational programmes was the 
author’s belief that construction professionals need to be educated to high 
standards in order that they are equipped to provide their client with flexible, self-
motivated designers, with a significantly well developed sense of ethics reasoning. 
Accordingly, favouring experiential or cognitive learning as opposed to 
behaviourist approaches, more suited to the ‘results orientated’ school than a 
‘student-centred’ one (Race 2001), and cognisant of experiential learning 
approach the author sought to create the PtD educational programmes, 
incorporating one facet of cognitive learning; problem based learning (PBL) 
referred to by Freire, cited in Pietrykowski (1996) as problem posing education, 
which challenges the student to develop or further develop their critical thinking 
skills, regardless of their learning style (Honey and Mumford, 1992).  
PBL is a generic term; described by Woods (1996) as “...one of the most exciting 
and powerful educational options that has appeared in the last 30 years”, allows 
the students to practice and process the learning in a meaningful and productive 
manner. The premise being that it promotes and encourages learning as a life skill, 
not a means to an end. Yusof et al (2005) asserted that PBL, “…encourages self-
directed learning and knowledge construction...and ongoing cognitive 
restructuring”. This approach would help the students’ progress, from whatever 
                                                 
13 Perhaps more correctly ‘high tarrif’. 
 TOC 
66 
point of learning and development they presently held, to the highest stage of 
contextual knowing (Baxter Magolda, cited in Carney, 2002). PBL was also 
generally recognised as promoting the requirement for a deep approach to 
learning and fitted with the concept of constructive alignment, a term coined by 
Biggs and Tang (2003), which in effect simply means ensuring that the learning 
activities match the intended learning outcomes in a manner that allows the 
student to construct meaning from any exercises they are required to do. 
Constructive alignment is about creating a supportive and encouraging learning 
environment/ set of learning activities where the educator facilities self-managed 
learning in the students. This approach facilitates deep learning. The Higher 
Education Authority cautioned that constructive alignment is neither easy nor 
straightforward, requiring that the educator “...constantly modifies course design 
and delivery, constantly trying to work closer to the unattainable perfect 
constructive alignment.” (HEA, 2004). 
 
5.5 Authors input into Designers’ CPD 
Professional training and development has evolved over the years as an integral 
aspect of corporate social responsibility. Forward-thinking corporate organisations 
no longer saw the development of the intellectual and professional capacities of 
their staff as being beneficial only to the individual. Rather, it had becoming more 
widely accepted that the professional development of staff significantly 
influenced organisational output and corporate advancement. The challenge of 
managing safety, health and wellbeing continues to confront organisations of all 
sizes, whether it is in operation management (OAC), McAleenan and McAleenan 
(2001; 2002) or in prevention through design (DSAC), McAleenan and 
McAleenan (2004). As key performance indicators continued to grow tighter 
amidst varying socio-economic demands, organisations could have inadvertently 
come under more pressure to compromise the safety, health and wellbeing of their 
staff. However, where a dynamic and effective staff training and re-training 
regime had been established across the strata of an organisation, the potential for 
sustainable achievement of an optimum safety, health and wellbeing performance 
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was high. Construction was a key industry and a force for economic stability. 
With the international trends in relation to alternative fuels exploitation, unstable 
economic climates, oil and gas price volatility and the like; organisations needed 
to continue to rely on intellectually and professionally enhanced designers to cope 
favourably with the emerging challenges. 
The Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE, 2015) has defined continuing professional 
development (CPD) as: 
 “The systematic maintenance, improvement and broadening of knowledge 
and skills, and the development of personal qualities, necessary for the 
execution of professional and technical duties throughout your working 
life”. 
This view aligned with the professional engineers’ rules of professional conduct, 
which went further than just requiring members to develop themselves but asked 
that professional engineers assist others in their CPD.  
With that in mind and with the onset of the CDM regulations the author had 
developed a series of seminars, case study working days and full training 
programmes for practising engineers (Appendix 5) to assist their professional 
development. Within the NI Government Agency, the author wrote a safety 
management procedure, SM14 (Appendix 5) to fit with the revised CDM 
requirements espoused in the revised ACoP of the early 2000s. The procedure and 
the training was delivered around the DSAC approach to design safety 
(McAleenan and McAleenan 2004), aligned to OAC (McAleenan and 
McAleenan, 2001; 2002) and with the PtD principle in mind. It is worth noting 
that the SM14 document of 2002 (Appendix 5) referred to a lead designer 
responsibility. The duties and responsibilities applied then in the author’s work 
(Appendix 5) were reflected in the CDM 2015 regulations in Great Britain (Health 
and Safety Executive 2015c). Accordingly, any professional development training 
programmes needed to grasp the new concepts, not just behind the CDM 




A fundamental aspect of the training delivered to practising engineers was that 
evidence was needed that they had achieved a level of knowledge, understanding 
and that their capability to perform the duties required of them under the CDM 
regulations confirmed. The training, which included a written competence based 
assessment, was created to tested candidates’ knowledge and understanding. A 
threshold pass of 75% was agreed with the Client as being satisfactory. Some 
candidates failed the assessment on the first attempt and re-sat it and the message 
that was sent out across the remaining prospective candidates was that this 
programme was being taken seriously by the training provider, their employer and 
ultimately their professional body. A few hundred candidates undertook the 
training and assessment between 2002 and 2008 and all the successful candidates 
were entered onto a register, providing they had the experience to go along with 
the tested knowledge and understanding. All the details were held by their 
employer as evidence of their ability to act as Lead designers/ CDM coordinators. 
Appendix 5 gives further details of the training programmes on offer.   
 
5.6 MEng/ BEng: Safety Engineering and Disaster Management 
Emergency response projects are complex and highly demanding, involving a 
number of different and well-coordinated courses of action. It is vital that these 
complex activities are well planned. Consequently, the success of aid projects in 
emergency response from planning through to the completion stage depends on 
the various parties’ understanding of partnership and mutual trust and the common 
objectives that they share. The roles of parties involved in post-disaster 
reconstruction have to be carefully arranged for the performance of reconstruction 
activities. The safety engineer’s role is that of a specialist, educated in the core 
engineering and scientific disciplines with the additional critical educational base 
connected with the principles of prevention through design and dealing with 
humanitarian crises. After many years of ad-hoc teaching of safety from an ethical 
perspective and prevention through design at under-graduate level the author 
joined a team at the Ulster University with the distinct agenda to develop a full 
structured degree programme, focussed specifically on safety engineering and 
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disaster management (Appendix 6). The rationale for the combining of these two, 
seemingly disparate disciplines was that recent years had seen many natural 
disasters (such as: floods, hurricane winds and earthquakes) and technological 
disasters (such as fires and explosions at chemical plants, nuclear facilities and 
both on and off-shore oil platforms). The disasters have been on a global scale, 
requiring the skills and expertise of engineers from around the world, often at 
short notice and often with a significant human dimension.  
As a safety engineer with high levels of analytical, creative (McAleenan, 2015b) 
and evaluative skills associated with PtD a graduate of the programme would be 
in a position to devise mitigatory steps to avert disaster using intelligent 
engineering and professional emergency management practices. Engineers, with 
specialist skills in designing structures to withstand potential disasters in the 
natural and in the built environment, who also have the analytical and creative 
skills needed to produce innovative solutions to disaster scenarios would be 
highly desirable/ employable. In the event of natural and technological disasters it 
is the engineers who are called upon. The two key focal points of the programmes, 
safety engineering and disaster management, where intertwined perfectly to 
educate and prepare students for roles within industry. The safety engineering 
strand concentrates on intelligent design of systems and processes to create more 
efficient organisations and industries with a highly attuned emphasis on 
environmental sustainability and inherently safe design for all concerned. The 
complementary disaster management focus explores the macro issues to prepare 
students to be able to lead and manage disaster response teams in a truly 
international context.  Students will be prepared to able to respond to both natural 
and technological disasters equipped with the skills and thorough understanding 
of their ethical role in terms of designing critical solutions to highly sophisticated 
problems with the primary aim of preserving or improving human life. Engineers 
with such a specialist ‘safety engineering’ skill set and a strong humanitarian 
affinity would be best placed to help communities in need, anywhere in the world 
to either avoid or recover from the impact of natural or technological disasters. 
Both programmes, MEng and BEng, were developed in line with UK SPEC 
(Engineering Council, 2014) The BEng programme would prepare graduates for 
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Incorporated Engineer (IEng) status while the MEng would be suited to those 
progressing to recognition as a Chartered Engineer (CEng). What follows is a 
selection of some of the modules students on the degree programme are to 
experience. 
 
5.6.1 Humanitarian Engineering 
Humanitarian engineering is engineering where human benefit is the primary 
concern. Engineers have the skills and ability to help people and communities 
most in need and most specifically in the face of adversity, such as in a post-
disaster situation or in extreme emergencies. In a conflicted or turbulent 
environment humanitarian engineers are often the first on the scene and often 
have to make decisions on a limited or zero budget. And while UN and others in 
world community rally around and find the funds they rely heavily on the services 
of the humanitarian engineer. This aspect of the degree programme introduces 
students to humanitarian skills and practices, giving them an understanding of the 
characteristics of natural disasters, conflicts and complex emergencies. It 
challenges the students’ inspiration and beliefs helping them to work out personal 
motivation for humanitarian relief work as they conceive the difficulties 
associated with designing solutions to intrinsically complex and scalable 
problems. 
 
5.6.2 Safety: An International and Ethical Perspective 
The industry, set against a backdrop of fatal incidents and fatal ill-health 
outcomes has much work to do (Health and Safety Executive, 2015a). Central to 
that is the engineers’ responsibility to have the safety, health and wellbeing of 
workers at forefront of their minds throughout the design process. Inherently 
safe[r] designs are more than just an aspiration; they are a categorical imperative 
(Balmforth, 2015). Indeed, they are a professional imperative, enshrined in the 
engineers’ code of ethics.   
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It is the safety engineer’s role to be able to identify and take responsibility for 
their safety, health and well-being obligations, to be in a position to implement 
appropriate management systems and to have an understanding of legislative 
requirements, ethical codes and international protocols as they relate to safety, 
health and wellbeing. To that end the safety engineer needs to have an 
understanding of and have the ability to implement a PtD approach to their work, 
taking account of, among other things, approaches to design safety analysis, OAC, 
workplace risk assessment, safety oriented method statements in the development 
of engineering design packages. The programme is designed to address the ethical 
responsibility and ethics reasoning ability that engineers and their allied 
professionals need to possess to ensure that the public and workers’ safety, health 
and wellbeing is at the forefront of all that they do. 
 
5.6.3 Prevention through Design 
Prevention through Design (PtD) also known as inherently safe[r] design has been 
well established in the process industry. In civil engineering/construction, 
producing designs that are capable of being built, used, maintained and eventually 
demolished in a safe and healthy manner has only ever been implicit in legislation 
since the Regulations were enacted to bring the EU Temporary and Mobile 
Workers Directive into force. The emergence of the principal designer in CDM 
regulations (Health and Safety Executive 2015c) lends voice and muscle to the 
emergence of formalised PtD education at the university level. PtD, the 
philosophy of safe design thinking that addresses safety, health and wellbeing 
issues in engineering design projects is a whole life approach that would 
encourage engineering students to critically reflect upon the safety, health and 
wellbeing impacts of their designs on individuals and on communities at all stages 
in the life of an engineering structure. The PtD life cycle is a fundamental aspect 
of a designer’s thoughts and a key intellectual quality of the safety engineer. 
PtD looks beyond the idea that reducing/ mitigating the impact of hazards is an 
operational/ management issue to the realisation that hazards need to be identified 
at the concept stage, addressed more fully at the scheme design stage and 
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wherever possible/practical eliminated at the detailed design stage. This 
challenging proposition is the role of the design engineer in a trans-disciplinary 





Chapter 6. Conclusion and Further Research  
6.1 Impact of Original Contribution to Knowledge  
We live in a complex world, of our own making, but is it the world that is 
complex or is it the rules; laws, codes and guidelines? Perhaps the rules are fine 
and it is the interpretation of them that creates the complexity. In developing the 
projects, presented herein the author focussed on finding the simple, not the 
simplistic in approaches to safety, health and wellbeing. What is wrong with 
simple? For that matter what is wrong with complex? The challenge is to find the 
right balance between approaches; complex enough to deliver results and simple 
enough to be understood by all. Robens (1972) said there is “too much law” and 
that was the backdrop to the introduction of the Health and Safety at Work etc. 
Act 1974, an all-encompassing law that would for the first time apply to every 
workplace and every possible work situation.  
Following years of reacting to EU directives the conservative government in 2010 
set out to reverse the trend of producing new and more regulations in response. 
Professor Lofstedt was engaged to determine whether UK did in fact still “too 
much law”. Lofstedt (2011) concluded that the volume of laws, regulations and 
guidelines were not the issue and neither was it their complexity. Rather it was 
down to misinterpretation (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2014); simple and 
straightforward made complex through misinterpretation and misunderstanding 
and it was this that OAC (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2001; 2002) was designed 
to challenge. The author contributed these views, through membership of the ICE 
Expert H&S Panel, tasked with contributing to the CIC/ ICE response (CIC/ ICE, 
2011) to the Lofstedt review (Lofstedt, 2011).  
At the CIB W099 conference (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2009) discussion 
centred around the idea that workers should go to work and come home again in 
the same physical and healthy condition.  
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The author’s view (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2014), upon reflection, was that 
why shouldn’t workers come home from work with their health and wellbeing 
improved, rather than just remaining the same. If, in the culturally mature 
company, work contributes to the wellbeing of society (McAleenan and 
McAleenan, 2009), then surely that must equally apply to the individual workers. 
That is the strongest impact of OAC (McAleenan, 2001; 2002) and prevention 
through design (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2004).  
Reflecting the author’s views (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2001; 2002; 204) the 
Seoul Declaration (KOSHA, 2008) directed that approaches to workplace safety 
needed to be positive, benefit focussed with wellbeing and welfare to the fore. 
This approach, this new mindset, coming from the International Labour 
Organisation was an external validation of the author’s research and project 
development sine the 1990s. The twin elements of critical conscientiousness and 
dialogics; are central to a worker driven approach to operational control, the 
objective being to understand the world, expose its contradictions and act, 
illuminated by understanding (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2013).  
Fundamentally the worker and the company have to listen, co-exist, interact and 
respond, however there needs to be an awareness of and being prepared to work 
with the contradictions that might arise. The author’s twin survival objectives 
(McAleenan and McAleenan, 2010), safety of the worker (survival of the 
individual) and profitability (survival of the company) laterally had a third 
objective added, the enhancement of society (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2014). 
The impact OAC has for workers’ safety, health and wellbeing relies on the fuller 
competence definition; that is going beyond skills, knowledge and experience 
(McAleenan and McAleenan, 2007; 2008) to include authority to make 
appropriate decisions and resources to deliver safe and healthy operations.  
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The introduction praxis, embracing the principle of prevention had the effect of 
taking workplace safety to another level allowing room for the principle of 
enhancement to potentially become the norm (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2014). 
This was ethics reasoning at its highest level (McAleenan and McAleenan, 2011; 
2012), respecting the dignity of all and recognising the equality of worth of all 
living things.  
Despite the complex nature of the world of work and the rules by which we all 
live we can come to look at the world through each others eyes (McAleenan and 
McAleenan, 2014) and understand each others position. Outwith individually held 
goals and through the application of OAC and PtD (McAleenan, 2001; 2002; 
2004) there is a common goal that workplaces contribute to the wellbeing and 
welfare of our workforce and society. 
 
6.2 The route to Vision Zero Harm 
The author believes in a world of work where vision zero harm is a real prospect. 
There cannot be employers or workers who deliberately set out to harm, maim or 
even kill their workers or their colleagues. The incidents still happen, despite the 
best efforts of many. So if it isn’t a deliberate act to injure and collectively we 
possess the technological and intellectual capacity to eliminate harm from the 
workplace and we have an ethical and moral responsibility to try and achieve that, 
what isn’t working?  
The big picture question then is can vision zero harm be achieved in the 
construction sector today, by 2020, 2030 or in some other future date?  
The choice is not one an individual can make but if on one particular day in the 
future every person on every construction site would do everything possible to 
ensure no one was harmed that day could it be repeated the next day? And the 
next... What is needed is collaboration between two powerful forces. Industry and 
academia between them have the total capability to research, investigate and 
instigate research findings that have relevance and impact. If only the two sides of 
the one coin would spend the time getting to know each other’s wants and wishes, 
then that can happen. Perhaps first in a small way, but if the impact of such 
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beginnings can show positive results then the lessons learnt can be copper-
fastened and moved further out into other parts of the construction industry and 
then beyond. There is a real sense of urgency as ILO (2015) are continuing to 
report deaths from work-related injury and ill-health in excess of 2 million 
annually. But if every worker, employer, every researcher in this field asked what 
can I do today to ensure the vision zero harm becomes a reality? Could the 
objective be achieved? The author believes it could. The questions, going forward, 
that will help this progress are:  
 How well do education, training, and professional development prepare design 
professionals in the provision of inherently safe[r] designs?  
 How can research into safety and health deliver improvements in workers’ 
conditions and their quality of life?  
 What progress towards achieving ‘vision zero’ is likely to be brought about 
from current research across all jurisdictions? and  
 Are the ethical and moral challenges understood around the globe and 
addressed appropriately in research projects?  
Despite best intentions much work is still needed to determine how these and 
other related safety, health and wellbeing questions are being addressed in 
industry and across academia. Just as ILO (2015) has the intention to create 
worldwide awareness of the critical issues affecting workers’ safety health and 
wellbeing so too should the active researchers in the field. OAC worked when a 
NI Government agency used it to its full capacity, reducing their accident rate by 
almost 70% of its pre-OAC figures. Putting OAC together with the PtD principles 
within an organisation to meet vision zero harm objective gives the organisation 
the capacity to fully deliver. Going forward with the combined power of OAC/ 
PtD worked in harmony is the answer. However as suggested earlier there would 
likely be merit in starting this process using the diagnostic functionality of OCMI 
to establish the organisation’s readiness to embrace OAC/PtD. One further area to 
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focus upon is 3rd level education, mindful of the challenges14 set out by the EU 
(EASHW 2010) and the call set out in the Québec City Protocol (ISSA 2003). The 
report and the protocol are concerned with the technical and the 3rd level 
education; preparing students for a world of work where safety, health and 
wellbeing is such an integral aspect of their professional thinking that vision zero 
can become a reality. Future research in this field has to be focused on how we 
can collectively realise such an ambition and it is here that organisations such as 
CIB W09915, presently developing its next Research Roadmap (publication date 
post-May 2016 after the World Building Congress), are invaluable. As a 
collective of safety researchers across the globe there is scope to take a considered 
and collective view in advancing research in PtD education and operation. The 
research findings in this area can be the catalyst for persuading accrediting bodies 
of the Engineering Council UK, such as the Joint Board of Moderators and the 
Engineering Accreditation Board that prevention through design needs to be a 
central tenet of all future civil engineering degree programmes, moving far 
beyond their requirement for “H&S risk management” (JBM, 2011). 
 
6.3 The lessons learned along the way 
The OAC approach has been consistently based on the premise that work 
activities must be viewed and carried out holistically with no unnecessary 
separation and devolvement of functions to others, particularly in the realm of 
                                                 
14 Examples of the challenges include: the need for partnerships with individual universities, 
faculties and professors; convincing professors of the importance of OSH education; 
high existing demands and pressures on undergraduate time; 
lack of suitable OSH educational materials for the university level; lack of university-level 
teaching staff with OSH expertise and/or active and participatory education skill 
15  CIB ("Conseil International du Batiment" roughly translated as International Council for 
Building) is a worldwide network of over 5000 experts from about 500 member organisations with 
a research, university, industry or government background, who collectively are active in all 
aspects of research and innovation for building and construction.  
One of CIB's Working Commissions CIB W099; Safety and Health in 
Construction is  committed  to  the  advancement  of  safety  and  health  of  construction  workers 
using all necessary  tools  to  accomplish  this  end  include  designing,  pre-
planning,  training,  management  commitment  and  the  development  of  a  safety  culture. CIB 
W099 believes that advancing the health safety and wellbeing of workers and the society within 
which we operate is a fundamental aspect of our professional and ethical being. 
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critical decision making vis-a-vis safety. Since the 1990s environmental 
responsibilities have in some considerable areas been devolved to the health and 
safety departments, as too has quality in some companies. It is not uncommon to 
see the acronym HSEQ to describe the role of the safety practitioner. In parallel 
with the increasing social and political awareness on environmental matters has 
been the developing concept of sustainability, once associated with environmental 
sustainability it now often explores the issue of business sustainability. Behm 
(2009) asked whether any industry that kills and injures its workers can be 
realistically called a sustainable industry, thus integrating the quality of workplace 
conditions with an ethical stand on whether the business should much less could 
be sustained. 
As the OAC approach was being introduced to businesses (McAleenan and 
McAleenan, 2001; 2002) it was being refined via regular presentations to 
gatherings of professional bodies; safety, construction, engineering and academic. 
Each refinement was a logical development of the preceding concepts, starting 
with the holistic approach to workplace safety, through the application of the 
principles of effectiveness to work management, through to the rational re-
integration of responsibility and authority to make decisions related to the work 
being undertaken. In the process it became apparent that realistic considerations of 
work activities must be seen in the context of their relationship with other 
activities on the shop floor or construction site as well as in the context of their 
wider societal and environmental considerations, locally, nationally and globally. 
The twin objectives for the sustainability of any business is for its activities to be 
good for the individual worker and good for the company and in this we have 
echoes of Fromm’s (1947) contention that what is good for the individual must of 
necessity be good for humanity.  
At the 2008 World Congress in Seoul it was reiterated that safety and good health 
at work was a fundamental human right enshrined in the UDHR, (McAleenan and 
McAleenan, 2008). Delegates were also warned of the negative impacts that 
globalisation and the then impending recession would have on the safety, health 
and wellbeing of workers and on the communities from which they came. As the 
leading employer, worker and government bodies come together to seek ways and 
means of eliminating the annual workplace death toll of 2.3 million in other 
 TOC 
79 
arenas and educational institutions discussions and activities are exploring ways in 
which Fromm’s (1947) case for a science of humanity to be a core component of 
all educational and professional development. In this a well educated worker in 
considering what is good for him in the context of his work activity will also be 
considering how that good meets the needs of his fellow man. The next step in the 
development of workplace culture centres not solely on whether a worker goes 
home as safely and as healthfully as he arrived that morning, but on how the 
culture of the workplace contributes to the overall benefit of society. In a recent 
personal correspondence (anon 2015) with the author a practising safety person 
lamented the consistent failure of anyone “to take a serious approach to sorting 
out our industry in terms of H&S and skills”. The correspondent concluded:  
“[This] industry will never change here unless something drastic 
happens. I have wasted enough of my energy and personal pain trying 
to change it. The industry and the people that should know better 
simply don't get it.”  
What prompts someone to reach such a conclusion? Is it that this person’s grasp 
of the processes of history, and the ability to translate thought into action is 
shaped solely by negative constructs? When Freire (1970) spoke of 
“conscientization” and Sherratt (2012) spoke of “social constructionism” there is 
just as much the possibility that negative constructs shape the negative attitudes 
that pervade the consciousness of individuals. If there exists a myriad of negative 
quality experiences and the numbers experiencing them are large then the 
challenge in the implementing of OAC/ PtD thinking and action is huge, yet not 
insurmountable. Seeing the vastness of a problem can sometimes see only 
obstacles and with that comes feelings of inadequacy.  
If you can break any safety, health or wellbeing challenge down and see each 
smaller manageable portion as a problem with a solution; praxis, then positive 
constructs can become the standard. As each person commits to the competent to 
become competent concept, aligning that thought to a continual challenge to 
investigate and improve upon the challenges faced in the workplace there is the 
opportunity to bring safety, health and wellbeing to its pinnacle. It is the authors 
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firm belief that the adoption of the tools and techniques critiqued and reflected 
upon herein will allow workers to regain control of their safety, their learning and 
their destiny and what logically follows is the achievement of the definitive 
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A1.2 Conference Papers for Presentation in 2016 
McAleenan, C. and McAleenan, P. 2016. The Construction Project Managers’ OSH 
Responsibilities. Proceedings CIB World Building Congress 2016, Tampere, Finland. 
May 2016. 
McAleenan, P. and McAleenan, C. 2016 An Ethics Reasoning Approach to Health and 
Safety in Construction. Proceedings CIB World Building Congress 2016, Tampere, 
Finland. May 2016. 
 
A1.3  Journal Papers in Preparation in 2016 
McAleenan, P. and McAleenan, C., 2016. Calculation of the number of synergistic 
hazards and risks on construction sites that limits the efficacy of risk assessment matrices. 
(Submission to ICE’s Management, Procurement and Law journal). 
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McAleenan C and Oloke D (eds) “ICE Manual of Health and Safety in Construction”. 
London: Thomas Telford Ltd. 
 
2012 
Maharaj, R., McAleenan, C. and McAleenan, P., 2012. Managing Safety in Construction: 
EDF Energy Nuclear New Build. Manchester: ARMSA Consulting 
 
2013 
McAleenan, C and McAleenan, P (2013) “Health and Safety for Construction 
Professionals” EEI Publishing, Downpatrick, NI 
 
2014 
McAleenan, C. and McAleenan, P., 2014. Management of Environmental Impacts. In 
Hill, D (Ed) (2014) “Construction Safety Management and Engineering” American 
Society of Safety Engineers. Des Plaines, Il 
McAleenan, P. and McAleenan, C., 2014. Ladders. In Hill, D (Ed) (2014) “Construction 




McAleenan, C and McAleenan, P., 2015. Leadership – A Negation of Agency. In Opoku, 
A. and Ahmed, V. (eds) In Leadership and Sustainability in the Built Environment. 
Routledge, London,  
McAleenan C and Oloke D (eds) 2015. ICE Manual of Health and Safety in Construction 
(2nd ed). London: ICE Publishing 
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McAleenan, C and McAleenan, P., 2015. Developing an ethical framework for health and 
safety in construction; the role of the client. In Haugbølle, K. & Boyd, D. (eds) 
Leadership and Sustainability in the Built Environment. Oxon: Taylor and Francis. 
 
A1.5 Project Outputs 
 A new model for Safety Management: Operation Analysis and Control 
 Prevention through Design Training Manuals 
 Safety Engineering and Disaster Management Degree Programme. 
 4 Databases: Operational Analysis and Control, Chemical Safety Analysis and 
Control, Compliance Tracker and Accident Recorder. 
 30+ Papers (listed above) 
 3 edited books 
 Chapters in 5 books 
 CD ROM: Confined Spaces Expert 
 Confined Spaces Licensing and Certification Programme. 
 Protocols for Low Voltage Working, Temporary Traffic Management, Contractors’ 
Relationships Protocol, and Manual Handling of Kerbs. 
 Safety Manual (including 4 full working safety websites;  
o Roads Service [intranet];  
o web-safety.com; 
o confinedspaces.com; and  
o notoneaccident.com. 
 Pocket Safety Book  
 Environmental Handbook 
 Audit and Accident Reports (Internal and External validation) 
 3 National/ International Awards. 
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Appendix 2 The OAC Model Explained 
 
A2.1 The OAC model. 
 
A2.1.1 Stage 1: Analyse the Operation. 
1. What can cause harm? (Look for the harm factors in the work operation itself, the 
workers, the materials, the machinery and plant, the public & visitors and the 
environment). 
2. What are you doing about it? (Once you know what can cause harm you look for 
the controls that are needed to prevent that harm from occurring). 
3. Is it enough? (At this stage, before embarking on the work operation, consider 
whether you have done enough to prevent harm. If necessary seek specialist 
advice e.g. from trade or professional associations, manufacturers, your National 
Statutory Safety Body, other safety professionals etc). Things can go wrong and it 
important to try and anticipate that as early as possible. Ask; 
 What could go wrong? 
 How could it happen? and  
 How would you deal with it? 
Asking the questions at the outset focuses the mind and ensures that you have 
considered all the foreseeable incidents and planned for them. Additionally you 
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are prompted to consider what emergency plans you need to have in place prior to 
starting an operation. 
A2.1.2 Stage 2: Manage the Operation. 
1. What has to be done? (Having carried out the analysis you must list what has to 
be done to ensure a safe outcome to the work operation. E.g. have you made your 
employees aware of what can cause them harm and what they must do? do you 
know what training they need?, are there written safety instructions? Does 
everyone know who is responsible and for what? etc). 
2. What resources do you need? (Material, human, financial). It is important that, 
having identified the resources, you make them available. (Some will be needed 
well in advance of any work operation. Build your controls into your budget and 
business plan). 
3. When does the operation need to be reviewed? Believing that you have a safe 
workplace is a sure way of ensuring that you have not. Like every aspect of your 
work safety needs to be continually managed and improved, as necessary. It is 
important therefore that a time or circumstance is set for reviewing the 
effectiveness of the management controls. The review period could be; 
 When new processes or new equipment is introduced to the operation, 
 When new techniques have been developed, 
 When statutory obligations require it, 
 When resources inputs are set to change, 
 When an accident or incident occurs, or 
 At regular intervals (determined by the nature and complexity of the hazards 
present). 
Note: The list above is not exhaustive. Carry out an effective review at any other 
time, should you feel it is warranted. 
A2.1.3 Stage 3: Effectiveness review. 
1. Has the operation progressed as planned? Things change or things can go wrong. 
You need to be aware of the effects of any change and try to anticipate how they 
will need to be dealt with. Ask yourself the following questions; 
 What has changed since the last operation analysis?’, ‘What effect will it 
have on operational management?’, and ‘How will it be dealt with?’, 
If nothing has changed then note that the review has taken place and set the 
next review date. 
Where things have gone wrong ask the following; 
  ‘What went wrong?’, ‘How did it happen?’, and ‘How did you deal with it?’. 
Note: We do not always get it right but if an accident does occur that is no reason 
to give up or to accept lower standards. Accepting accidents as inevitable is 
fatalistic16. The objective of integrating the highest standards of health and safety 
                                                 
16 In fact defining incidents that lead to harm (or which could have resulted in harm) as accidents 
portrays a belief that some things are unforseeable and therefore ‘just happem’. Supplant 




with improved business performance means that the end product/ service must be 
achieved in a manner that protects employees and the public from harm. 
Operating to any less a standard will only guarantee a negative outcome and 
ensure that accidents continue. 
 
2. Detail the changes needed. If changes have occurred then itemise them and 
consider how they will affect the operation. 
3. List the improvement actions. Draw up an action plan, identifying the resources 
implications, managers responsible for completing the actions and the timescales 
for completion. 
A2.2 Work objectives 
Set your work objectives to include…  
“...tasks/ activities are to be completed on time and in a manner that does not cause harm 
to the workers, the public, other non-employees, and/ or the organisation.” 
In practice this means that for construction activities structures are to be designed in a 
way that they can be built, used, maintained and eventually demolished, taking full 
account of the safety of the construction workers, end users the maintenance workers, 
those tasked with eventual demolition/ partial demolition and anyone else that may be 
affected by the construction activities. 
  
                                                                                                                                     
started. In the proving of OAC [Project 2] a discussion takes place on how this aspect expanded to 
meet the needs. 
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Appendix 3 Various Iterations of the OAC Model 
 





A3.2 The OAC model 2002. 
 
A3.3 The OAC model 2015. 
Operational Analysis and Control (OAC)
Model
Analyse the Operation
Manage the  Operation
Effectiveness Review
What can cause harm?
What are you doing about it?
Is it enough?
What has to be done?
What resources do you need?
When does the operation need reviewed?
Has the operation progressed as planned?
Detail the changes needed?
List the improvement actions?
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Appendix 4 Risk Management – A Failed Paradigm 
 
A4.1 Critical Discourse 
The subject ‘Risk management – A Failed paradigm’ was deliberately polemic to engage 
as many as possible in the debate. The discussion opened [paraphrased and edited for 
anonymity] as follows: 
 
“I [the author] would contend that risk management has failed and that it is time 
to rethink the strategy! There is no reason to believe that anyone accepts that zero 
fatalities are an impossibility, but the question; “If it is truly a ‘high risk 
environment’ how could you ever have zero fatalities?” goes to the heart of the 
current critical evaluation of the concept of risk and risk management. The 
premise being that there is both the technological and intellectual capacity to 
achieve zero fatalities, but what prevents this is the ideological basis 
underpinning risk management. Logically ‘risk management’ is a ‘self-
contradicting’ statement that promotes the concept of acceptable levels of risk, 
i.e. injury and fatality. ‘Risk’ is a subjective measure of the possibility of danger 
being realised, used where there is an absence of certainty. In this absence of 
certainty you have ‘chance’ and it is chance that determines which of two 
outcomes are likely in the workplace; incident or no incident. Management is the 
authoritative control of operations. Where there is control of an operation 
‘chance’ is removed and the only possible outcome is that which has been 
established at the outset. If the outcome cannot be determined with certainty then 
chance exists and any action taken is a gamble that the actual outcome will in 
fact be the desired one.  
 
In practice risk management posits an acceptable level of risk and proceeds to 
manipulate the circumstances to increase the odds in favour of a non-injurious 
outcome. Ultimately, by accepting and acting on any level of risk we are 
gambling with the safety of workers. It is suggested in the original posting and 
elaborated upon that what we mean is that we put in place sufficient control 
measures to reduce the risk in hazardous environments. On the contrary safety 
management should not be interested in reducing the risk, rather it should be 
making the case for managing any operation in hazardous environments such that 
there is no risk. If safety, not the risk, is managed and we can control the safety of 
the operation then it does not matter how hazardous the environment is since the 
operation (properly analysed and controlled) is no longer dangerous and the 
outcome will always be non-injurious. People do and probably will continue to 
die in, for example confined spaces, for the foreseeable future but it is not 
because fatalities and major injuries cannot be prevented, rather it is because 
risk management acknowledges this as an acceptable outcome”. 
 
A4.2 The Discourse with analysis. 
Contributors to the discussion could not agree with one [Subject A] stating: 
 
“…I cannot accept your argument that "rather it is because risk management 
acknowledges this as an acceptable outcome". No death in confined spaces is 
 TOC 
102 
either a risk management decision or an acceptable risk management option. 
Death occurs through a number of factors, and the results nearly always point to 
a lack of risk management, not an acceptance that this will be the outcome of an 
acceptable risk management strategy. This would obviously contradict all H&S 
law and standards. Death is avoidable, perhaps with the exception of rare, 
unforeseeable and uncontrollable circumstances. The true risks lay in the facts 
that incompetent or untrained and inexperienced persons are often in control of, 
or undertaking such work. Management often fails to either recognise this or 
provide suitable and sufficient levels of experienced and competence to ensure 
that works carried out are done in a healthy and safe manner”. 
 
Further thoughts in support of risk management [Subject B] viewed risk management a 
little ‘less cynically’, trying to take a holistic approach to the subject and view the overall 
aspects of risk management as per BS8800, OHSAS18001 & HS(G)65- a cycle of 
continuous improvement, much as any other subject, skill is improved continuously.  
 
[Subject B] “No-one, it was argued by proponents of risk management or at least 
very few, have the resources to go from X amount of risk to zero risk in an instant. 
Risk management they argue is about identification of hazards and prioritization, 
which means that it takes time to eliminate all the possible hazards that face an 
organisation. And organisations change, ergo, new hazards arise that present 
risks that need to be addressed, or "managed" according to current legislation, so 
the cycle of continuous improvement goes on. There is also the application of the 
reasonably practicable risk/ sacrifice equation. Skill and experience is required 
to get it right. Risk management failed? I don't think so. In fact, it has probably 
only just begun” 
 
Interestingly the argument relying on the reasonably practicable risk/ sacrifice equation 
aspect works directly in opposition to the language in use and supports the failed 
paradigm argument. Thinking back to linguistic analysis and more specifically where 
descriptive linguistic analysis seeks to determine and interpret how society receives and 
reacts to the language as it is used this point has critical position, in as much as its effect 
on the society in question; the workforce is that sacrifice means occasional injury or 
fatality. A point so poignantly expressed by the entry of Subject C to the debate who 
posited;  
 
[Subject C] “As the working environment is continuously evolving … there are 
always going to be injuries and deaths in the workplace. I[t] should be the 
primary role of Risk Management to aim for complete control of risk. While 
realising that to achieve this is virtually impossible”. 
 
The following interjection from Subject D pointed towards support for the new paradigm, 
wrapped up in support of the old. Descriptive linguistics analysis points towards the 
language of intent. The need to go beyond the words to see the effects the language is 
having on the behaviour of the individual or the group. In this respect as the following 
argument rolls out look for the intent behind the words. 
 
[Subject D] (corrected for spelling and grammar only) “I have always held the 
opinion that zero accidents are a realistic goal but that in achieving that, 
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managing risk has to prioritise the risks in order to eliminate them. Risk 
management is about determining what risks require managing to what level. 
Determining the level of acceptable risk is just as important as managing the risk 
itself. Looking at larger organisations, some accept a level of fatality! The rail 
industry accepts 1 trackside fatality per 100000 employees as the target. If this is 
achieved then everyone will be happy and give themselves a pat on the back. But 
now we are moving into zero accidents as a statement for promoting cultural 
change. As a safety manager, I always define the goal a zero accidents. I will 
never accept an accident as acceptable and as such risk management must 
conform to that thinking in my organisation. In reality, when investigating 
accidents and incidents I do understand where foreseeable and unforeseen 
boundaries lie and try to make them foreseeable and solvable in the future. My 
simple answer is that you will get closer to the standard of safety you really want 
if you define it. If you accept that accidents will happen in accordance to the 
national averages and you are happy you are just under them, good for you. Risk 
management is about constant improvement; what we accept today we must not 
accept tomorrow. Risk management is the tool for the job and I think its real 
value lies in identifying the very things its being challenged on, what is 
acceptable and how long can it continue.” 
 
So perhaps throwing out the challenge that risk management is a failed paradigm had 
driven its devotees to clarify the reasons why they were in support of risk management. 
Was it just a language difference and if so was that reason enough for change, for a new 
approach, for a more precise and targeted model going into the future? Language 
influences our thinking overtly or subliminally, something marketers know only to well. 
In recent times road traffic accidents have come to be referred to as road traffic collisions. 
Why? What was the difference between ‘accident’ and ‘collision’? Straight away it was 
clear that the collision was the outcome of an undesired traffic event, whereas accident 
had the potential to go towards blame or its avoidance under the argument that accidents 
are ‘unforeseeable’ events. Going back to the earlier part of the millennium the National 
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), a US Government Agency defined 
accidents as ‘control failures’ (McAleenan and McAleenan 2005) in an attempt to put the 
focus squarely where it belonged; a failure in control. Interestingly Subject E defended 
this position well, while still suggesting opposition to the author’s core premise. For 
instance one of Subject E’s arguments;  
 
[Subject E] “I cannot agree with [author’s] statement that “If safety, not the risk, 
is managed and we can control the safety of the operation then it does not matter 
how hazardous the environment is since the operation itself is non-hazardous and 
the outcome will always be non-injurious” I believe that this point of view is not 
only erroneous but also dangerous, because if you assess the risks from the 
hazards implicit in the operation without taking into account those risk factors 
introduced by the physical, psycho-social or organisational environment you will 
fail to examine all the risks and are unlikely to manage or carry out the work 
safely, even if no loss occurs. For example, in working in confined spaces in 
limestone regions carbon dioxide may migrate into confined spaces under low 
pressure, if this is not taken into account in the safe working procedures and 
practices, then asphyxiation could result, even though the atmosphere is not 
deficient in oxygen. In this case the fact the risk was not accessed does not mean 
that it was acceptable, nor does it mean that because someone was not 




Subject E conflated hazard and risk as many often do (McAleenan and McAleenan 2002). 
And in consequence the argument presented, once the word ‘risk’ was replaced with 
‘hazard’ in Subject E’s argument works directly in support of the thinking behind the 
author’s original premise. In further support Subject E agreed that risk management 
promoted the concept of acceptable levels of risk, that risk management posited an 
acceptable level of risk and that risk was subjective, however Subject E did not accept 
that risk was totally subjective, or that we were gambling with the safety of workers. This 
was an understandable response to a deliberately polemic interjection to an ordinarily 
caring and impassioned profession. Subject A interjected at that point in support of 
Subjects E’s statement: 
 
[Subject A] “In summing up the debate the following the following became clear. 
There is no risk in an operation. Either you will achieve your objective or you 
won’t. Risk exists only in ignorance, that is that you don’t know whether you will 
succeed or fail. A managed operation, however, is one in which all of the hazards 
have been considered and the controls have been put in place so that the 
operation itself is free from risk. If risk continues to exist it can only be because 
there are insufficient controls and that may be for a variety of reasons”. 
 
Challenging an accepted paradigm was not cynical as Subject B suggested since the 
concept of continuous improvement had to extend to looking at how well our 
management systems had performed and to moving on when they fail to meet our 
expectations. Risk management was not a divine paradigm above evaluation and 
criticism. On the contrary by exposing its limitations we could go beyond it to a paradigm 
that would achieve the “vision zero harm” objective. Risk management by definition was 
self-contradictory and as it was practised accepted that an injurious outcome to some 
work activities was unavoidable such that it merely sought to reduce the likelihood. In 
UK’s H&S legislation the term: “so far as is reasonably practicable”, and in HSG65, 
BS8800, and OHSAS18000 there was an acceptance of that position. Proper management 
of the entire operation required that you define your operational outcome (to include a 
non-injurious outcome), provide the resources and review (as necessary) so as to consider 
the possibility of failure, prior to commencement, during the process and at various other 
stages. Also known as: safe to start, safe to execute and safe to finish. 
 
A4.3 Conclusions drawn from the discourse. 
Much of what was offered by the safety professionals was defensible but where the risk 
management paradigm differed was in its acceptance of risk and therefore its acceptance 
of some failure. Subject C and others stated “there are always going to be injuries and 
deaths in the workplace". Accepting this as an inevitable outcome sets expectations and 
limitations. Risk management supported this fatalistic approach to safety and sought to 
limit the likelihood of injury rather than to eliminate it totally. Subject B’s’ statement 
"reasonably practicable risk/ sacrifice equation" and Subject D’s rail industry figure of 1 
death in 100000 employees being ‘acceptable’ summed up the point that risk 
management accepted failure. The dead worker’s family and friends were not going to get 
much solace from the points raised. However, the point made by Subject D that you 
“…get closer to the standard of safety that you want if you define it…” and that 
“…continuous improvement is a necessary part of the management process…” is valid. 
In that regard the standards to be set should be a safe start, safe execution and safe 




Subject A’s views that management systems do provide the answer and that actual 
control measures are the most important safety factor had merit and they linked to Subject 
D’s point that "you get closer to the standard of safety that you want if you define it". You 
will achieve it if you manage it. There could only be one standard, no matter how you 
dress it up. Namely that we would produce products or deliver services in a manner that 
would not injure our workforce or others. That straightforward position, extended 
included; no damage to the environment or to profitability. In other words, it was not 
unreasonable to consider all the potential losses and put the proper controls in place prior 
to commencement. Bearing in mind that a risk is basically the element of chance in an 
activity, whether it was to be 50:50 or 1: 1,000,000. Every week millions of people in UK 
put money on worse odds in the National Lottery and most weeks one or more come 
persons succeed. Work environments where the element of chance is retained (for 
whatever reason) are environments where every week someone's number would come up. 
That is why ‘risk management’ costs the UK more the £20bn and the USA more than 
$127bn each year (McAleenan and McAleenan 2002, Health and Safety Executive 2015a, 
and Health and Safety Executive 2015b). No matter what the odds were, no matter how 
well "managed" the activity was, the next time could be that one in a million time 
because there is no ‘chance rule’ that says that the activity had to be done a million times 
before the accident occurred. In fact, every time could theoretically be that one in a 
million time. "Risk Management" simply tries to improve the odds. Roberts (2008) 
discussed how risk management concepts are generally well understood as a means of 
identifying safety requirements in product development processes. Roberts (2008) went 
on to address how the concepts of risk management and an approach to further enhancing 
safety by identifying key aspects of product functionality and user expectations into 
development could lead to a robust methodology for deriving product essential 
performance, and the inclusion of state-of-the-art aspects for optimal product safety 





Appendix 5: CDM Training Courses for Designers 
 
A5.1 CDM Course Outline 
Objective: By the end of this course attendees will demonstrate, through case study and competence assessment, their understanding and knowledge of the 
processes involved in preparing safe designs, together with the roles and responsibilities under the CDM Regulations and Office of Government Commerce 
Guidelines.  
Target Group: All lead/ senior designers and those who will be carrying out coordinator functions defined in CDM Regulations 2007. 
CDM Course for Lead designers and Coordinators 
































Setting the Scene  
CDM requirements 
Design safety analysis & control. 
What do they mean by “Safe to build, use, 
maintain and demolish”? 
 
Competence of Duty Holders; 
 
 Client  





What Contractors expect. 





CDM Course for Lead designers and Coordinators17 


















13:40                            
From brief to design – a Designer’s View  
Competency - Advising the client 
Design safety analysis in Practice  
Preparing and presenting pre-construction information.  
Case Study 
Part 1a - Identifying Hazards  
Part 1b - Design safety analysis/ Risk Assessment process  






9:00  11:00 13:40                           15:15 15:30 
Assessing Construction-phase plans - Good and bad examples. 
H&S when managing the project - review points. 
Preparing the H&S file. 
Project Hand over – End of project performance review 
Assessments; 
Pre-qualification & tender  















                                                 
17 Key Reference Material: CDM ACoP (HSE), H&S in Construction (HSE), Achieving Excellence in Construction – Procurement Guide 10 (OGC), and 
CIRIA Report C604 (Author’s note: CIRIA report C604 has been superceded by CIRIA report C755, which reflects the CDM 2015 Regulations) 
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A5.3 SM14 Sample CDM Procedure 
Purpose 
To define the construction, design and management procedures necessary to ensure the 
proper health and safety management of Roads Service construction projects. 
Scope  
The management and planning of all design, maintenance, construction and demolition 
work carried out by Roads Service or on behalf of Roads Service. 
Definitions  
 Construction Work – refer to Construction Design and Management Regulations 
2007 (Reg. 2). 
 Notifiable Project – where construction work exceeds 30 working days or involves 
more than 500 ‘person’ days (Note: Term Contracts are not notifiable, however 
specific construction projects carried out under the Term Contract may be). 
 Client – Divisional Roads Manager/ Project Owner or DBFO Company. 
 CDM Register – A register of individuals who have the qualifications and 
experiences identified at Procedure 4.0 (below) and are deemed competent to act as 
the lead designer or co-ordinator. 
Procedures 
1.0 Appointments 
a. Roads Service Consultancy (RSC) is to act as Roads Service’s lead designer, 
except where projects are managed by SRI Teams (see Procedures 12.0 and 
13.0) or where the Client retains the design brief. 
b. Principal Engineers are to select individuals, from the CDM Register, with 
appropriate competence (see Procedure 4.0) to fulfil the duties of lead designer.  
c. Lead Designers are to select members of their design project team who are 
competent for the task, sufficiently resourced and aware of the extent of their 
authority. 
d. The Client is to appoint a co-ordinator at the start of any notifiable projects. 
e. The Client is to appoint a principal contractor for any notifiable projects.  
2.0 Notification of Projects 
a. The co-ordinator is to notify HSE (NI) of any projects that are expected to last 
more than 30 days or involve more than 500 ‘person’ days using Form NI 10. 
3.0 Co-ordination and Co-operation 
a. Lead designers are to ensure co-ordination and co-operation between members 
of the project design team in order that health and safety is properly addressed 
within the design and procurement process.  
b. The co-ordinator (normally the lead designer) is to ensure that the health and 
safety aspects of the design process have been addressed and to check that 
different design elements work together without causing danger. 
4.0 Competence – Designers and Co-ordinators 
a. The Head of Roads Service - Transportation and Engineering Policy Unit 
(TEPU) is to maintain a CDM Register listing people competent (including staff 
from the Partner organisation) to act as lead designer and co-ordinator.  
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b. The CDM Register is to be available on the Roads Service Intranet. 
c. The CDM Register will identify individuals who have the qualifications and 
experience identified in Procedure 4.0 (d & e) and who have achieved greater 
than 75% in a written assessment set by Roads Service. 
d. Lead designers and co-ordinators must have;  
 A sound working knowledge of health and safety in construction work,  
 A thorough knowledge of the design process, and 
 Experience of the site processes likely to be involved in the project and in 
future maintenance, refurbishment or demolition. 
e. Lead designers and co-ordinators with the following minimum qualifications 
and experience will be eligible to be considered for the CDM register; 
Category Description Minimum Qualification & Experience 
A. Projects requiring 
Technical Approval or 
Geotechnical Certification 
CEng MICE (or equivalent) with relevant 
experience. 
B. For all other projects Engineering Degree + 3 years relevant post-
qualification experience (inc. design), or 
Engineering HNC + 10 years relevant post-
qualification experience (inc. design) 
f. Individuals who are on the Institution of Civil Engineers’ Construction Health, 
Safety and Welfare Register or who are Fellows of the Association for Project 
Safety can be listed on Roads Service’s CDM Register. 
5.0 Competence - Consultants 
a. The pre-qualification questionnaire is to be used to establish external 
consultants’ H&S competence, before they are admitted to a Restricted List or 
before a contract is awarded. 
b. A member of Roads Service’s CDM Register who meets the requirements for 
Project Category A (Ref 4.0e) is to be included on each consultant assessment 
panel. 
6.0 Competence - Contractors 
a. A member of Roads Service’s CDM Register who meets the requirements for 
Project Category A (Ref 4.0e) is to be included on each contractors assessment 
panel. 
b. The pre-qualification questionnaire is to be used to establish a contractor’s 
technical/ professional ability in relation to health and safety competence and 
resources before they are admitted to a Restricted List or before a one-off 
contract is awarded. 
7.0 Resources and Timing 
a. The Client is to ensure that all the necessary information and resources are 
made available and that adequate time is allocated to projects. 
8.0 Training 
a. Before being allowed unaccompanied onto a construction site new recruits and 
staff new to construction are to be trained to recognise hazards on construction 
sites and to understand the requirements of construction related H&S 
procedures and protocols. 
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b. Individuals; attending sites, are to be familiar with relevant site hazards and 
associated control measures. 
c. Training and/ or instruction (including any necessary refresher training) for 
staff with construction responsibilities is to be linked to design needs and to the 
operational safety controls sheets, appropriate to their particular work 
activities. 
9.0 Design Safety Analysis 
a. Designers are to ensure that their designs can be built, used, maintained and 
eventually demolished, taking full account of the safety of the construction 
worker and anyone else that may be affected. 
b. Designers’ H&S decisions are to be determined through designers’ safety 
analysis. 
c. For Category A projects (4.0 e) the design safety analysis Form A is to be used. 
d. For Category B projects (4.0 e) and for construction work associated with 
Category 4 defects (Road Maintenance Standards) the design safety analysis 
Form B is to be used. 
e. Lead designer / co-ordinator is to liaise with contractor where onsite design 
changes are proposed. 
10.0 Pre-construction information and Construction Phase Plan 
a. Pre-construction information is to be issued with the instructions for tendering, 
identifying any H&S issues that a contractor could not reasonably be expected 
to anticipate (see Appendix 2 of the Approved Code of Practice (ACoP). 
b. The co-ordinator is to advise the Client on the suitability of the construction-
phase plan before the construction work is to start. 
Specific to Term Contracts 
c. The construction-phase plan may be accepted in framework format, providing 
it identifies how it will be developed during the period of the contract. 
d. The lead designer/ co-ordinator is to consider whether Term Contractors 
require additional pre-construction information for specific projects. 
11.0 Contractor performance 
a. The Project Manager / Engineer for the Works is to be informed, by his site 
staff, if a contractor fails to comply with H&S obligations. The necessary 
remedial action is to be agreed between all the appropriate parties and recorded 
on the Contractors’ H&S Report. 
b. The Contractors’ H&S Report is to be discussed at each site meeting and 
copies are to be sent to the Head of TEPU at the end of each quarter (July, 
October, January and April). 
c. The 6 monthly reviews and the end of contract review are to include an 
examination of; 
 H&S aspects of the Contractor Performance Assessments. 
 Actions taken following any RIDDOR incidents and accidents. 
d. The 6 monthly reviews, end of contract reviews and Contractor Performance 





12.0 H&S File (notifiable projects only) 
a. The co-ordinator is to prepare or update the H&S file and give it to the Client 
at the end of the project. 
b. The H&S file is only to contain health and safety information that will be 
relevant in future construction projects (see Paragraph 263 & 264 of the 
ACoP). 
c. Clients are to retain and keep H&S files up to date for as long as the roads or 
structures are in existence. 
d. Clients are to ensure that H&S files are available for designers or contractors 
during any future construction projects.  
e. Suitable backup arrangements are required when H&S files are presented in an 
electronic format. 
13.0 Design and Build Contracts 
a. The Client is to appoint a lead designer/ co-ordinator as soon as is practicable 
and no later than at the specification design stage.  
b. Roads Service - Project Owner is the Client for Design and Build Contracts. 
14.0 Design Build Finance and Operate (DBFO) Contracts 
a. The Client is to appoint a lead designer/ co-ordinator as soon as is practicable 
and no later than at specification design stage. 
b. Roads Service - Project Owner is the CDM Client for DBFO Contracts until a 
formal transfer of CDM Client responsibilities to the DBFO Company takes 
place. 
c. HSENI are to be informed of the transfer of CDM Client responsibilities. 
d. Roads Service’s lead designer/ co-ordinators are to liaise with the DBFO 
Company prior to carrying out additional works on DBFO roads. 
15.0 RSD as an Internal Contractor 
a. Director of Network Services is to approve Roads Service Direct’s Construction 
Phase Plan.  
b. Roads Service Direct’s Construction Phase Plan is to be reviewed, and revised 
as necessary at intervals no greater than 5 years. 
Responsibility 
1. Client (DRM/ Project Owner) is to ensure compliance with this Procedure.  
2. Head of RSC, Project Managers/ Engineers to the Works and Lead designers/ 
co-ordinators are to ensure compliance with Procedures 1.0 to 12.0 
3. Director of Strategic Programmes is to ensure compliance with Procedures 13.0 
and 14.0 
4. Director of Network Services is to ensure compliance with Procedure 15.0 (a). 
5. Head of RSD is to ensure compliance with Procedure 15.0 (b). 
6. Head of T&EPU is to ensure compliance with Procedure 4.0 (a-c and f). 
7. Line managers are to ensure compliance with Procedure 8.0. 
Documentation 
 Construction Phase Plan(s) 
 Designers’ Safety Analysis Form A 
 Designers’ Safety Analysis Form B 
 Form NI 10 (rev) 
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 Health and safety file(s) 
 Pre-construction Information 
 Pre-qualification Questionnaires  
References 
 “Managing Health and Safety in Construction” – Approved Code of Practice 
(L144) 
 “Road Maintenance Standards for Safety” RSPPG E019 
 
A5.4 Briefing Notes for CDM Course 
This course covers one aspect of the criteria needed to be a lead designer/ or to carry out 
coordinator functions. For all of the criteria refer to the Safety Manual - Safety 
management procedure (SM14) and the CDM Approved Code of Practice. 
 Our core business is construction and therefore we have to play our part in 
improving the safety record of the NI construction industry. 
 Fatal Accident Incidence Rates/ 100,000 workers 
 
1999 - 13.09 (NI) and 11.26 (GB) 
2000 - 5.4 (NI) and 9.02 (GB) 
2001 - 7.01 (NI) and 7.77 (GB) 
 
10 year average = 9.4 (NI) and 5.2 (GB) 
Ken Logan will update us on these figures. Welcome Ken 
 In Roads Service we have had our own experiences; 
o Fatality at Stop/ Go board operation (Roads Service worker 
approximately 2 years ago) 
o Fatality on M1 (Contractor's employee last year) 
 Fatalities have a way of bringing the safety message firmly home. We have no 
reason to accept fatalities in our industry. We have good procedures, processes 
and guidance. 
What more do we need? 
 Commitment...Easy to say but what does it mean in practice? 
 As a major Client Roads service has a robust system for designing and managing 
construction projects safely (SM14). 
 (Note: SM14 recently published is not new to Roads Service, rather it brought 
together into one clear document the process that had become custom and 
practice in Roads Service since CDM was introduced in 1995). 
 As a Director I can assure you of Roads Service Board members' commitment to 
making safety work for all of our staff and all those affected by our work. 
(CEO's new policy statement commits Roads service to working to international 
best practice) 
(CEO appointed RSC as Planning Supervisor - A role that each person attending 
this course will help us fulfil) 
Roads Service's business strategy and our objectives are prefaced with a 
commitment to achieve our goals in a manner that does not cause harm to 
workers or the road user. 
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 As an individual I can act as I would expect others to act - safely - so that I do not 
cause harm to myself or to my colleagues. 
 My commitment Corporately, as a manager and individually can and must be 
replicated by each of you and every other Roads Service employee in our own 
work activities and in our dealing with the wider construction industry. That is 
our opportunity to positively influence the industry's safety record. 
 In this course today and tomorrow you will learn or be refreshed in the skills 
needed to design safely and manage the construction planning process. That 
means the ability to design out hazards and to address those hazards that you 
cannot remove at the design stage. You are already competent in your field, or 
you wouldn't be sitting here. 
 Consider; 
o The buildability of the project,  
o The time and the resources needed to achieve success,  
o How will the contractor safely realise your designs,  
o The needs of the maintenance workers, and  
o The needs of the road user. 
 Finally, it is important that Roads Service as an organisation and you as 
competent Designers and Planning Supervisors; 
o Know the Roads service CDM strategy,  
o Implement it in the areas within your competence, and  
o Can provide evidence of this on demand. 
Note: The audit trail includes; 
o Completed designer risk assessment checklists,  
o NI10 - Notification of Project forms,  
o H&S plans and files. 
 
Some Extra Notes (to use or ignore) 
HSE’s specialist inspectors have conducted a number of in-depth designer audits in the 
North West over the last 3 years. The findings emerging from these audits fall into a 
familiar pattern, namely:  
 design staff had a lack of knowledge about the risks they were supposed to be 
addressing;  
 design staff had a lack of knowledge about their CDM duties (to eliminate, reduce 
and inform), combined with a lack of understanding about how to discharge them;  
 designers often produced volumes of generic risk assessments that were no help to 
the contractor and which gave the whole process a bad name. Typically, they were 
too long, contained little or no essential hazard information, and either stated what the 
contractor should do to satisfy the law or required the contractor to supply a method 
statement.  
 there was better understanding by the Principals of the design practice, but poor 
cascade to those operating at a more working level.  
If you want to assess yourself using the categories adopted by HSE’s specialist 
inspectors, please feel free to use our compliance summary sheet. 
In addition to these audits, in March 2003, HSE inspectors in the North of England and in 
Scotland invited designers to meet them on site at 123 major projects. The focus of the 
discussions was on falls from height, and the collated results showed that: 
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 About a third of the designers demonstrated little or no understanding of their 
responsibilities, and only 8% claimed to have received training in CDM;  
 Many of the design risk assessments were of poor quality and added little if anything 
to the safety of the construction process;  
 Designers were often abdicating their responsibility to reduce risk in relation to work 
at height by leaving it to the principal contractor, without first considering how they 
could change the design in a way which would make it safer to build, clean or 
maintain, and  
 Contractors were struggling to control risk which could easily have been eliminated 
or considerably reduced by good design.  
 
A5.5 Designers Case Study (PBL) One-day Course 
By the end of this session designers will be able to use the design risk assessment (DRA) 
process to ensure that they can meet their CDM obligations and use the information 
gathered in this process to prepare pre-tender H&S plans to the standards laid down in the 
Approved Code of Practice. 
To cover; 
 Introduction to SM14 and the Designer's role 
 Introduction to the Design Risk Assessment process. 
 Identifying hazards and preparing design risk assessment. 
 Preparation of pre-tender H&S plans. 
 CDM issues associated with Term Contracts. 
 
Time Session Title Trainer 
09:30 Introduction to SM14 and CDM Obligations Ciaran 
10:15 Introducing the case study Ciaran 
10:30 Case Study – Part 1a – Identifying hazards All 
11:00 Case Study – Part 1b – The Design Risk Assessment All 
12:15 Feedback All 
12:45 Lunch 
13:30 Introduction to H&S Plans Ciaran 
13:45 Case Study – Part 2 – Preparing a Pre-tender Plan All 
15:15 Feedback All 





Appendix 6 BEng/ MEng Safety Engineering and Disaster 
Management 
Increasing concerns over climate change and energy security, and the resultant emerging 
technologies and the growing threat of natural and man-made disasters means that today’s 
engineers are facing a new set of challenges. There is also a need for safety engineers 
who can design a system or structure, recognise the potential external and internal 
hazards and the modes of failure, and use this knowledge professionally. 
 
There is nothing that can be done to completely prevent disasters from occurring. 
However, it is possible to devise migratory steps against disaster with intelligent 
engineering and professional emergency management practices. Planning can lead to the 
protection of life, property and the environment. Thus, engineers with specialist skills in 
designing structures and systems to withstand potential disasters in the natural and the 
built environment, and those who have the knowledge to plan for emergency and provide 
solutions in the event of a disaster, are a highly sought after group of experts. Indeed, 
even from a non-emergency perspective, safety is a critical element for all design 
engineers. There are no existing undergraduate programmes at Ulster or in any other 
institutions on the island of Ireland, which equip engineers with this specialist skillset. 
Therefore, the BEng in Safety Engineering and Disaster Management is timely in 
addressing this need. The following are the key learning outcomes from the 
programme… 
 
Knowledge and Understanding 
 Demonstrate knowledge and understanding of essential facts, concepts, theories and 
principles of Safety engineering and Disaster Management, and the underpinning 
science and mathematics. 
 Have an appreciation of the wider multidisciplinary engineering context and its 
underlying principles. 
 Appreciate the social, environmental, ethical, economic and commercial 
considerations affecting the exercise of their engineering judgement. 
 Have an ability to integrate knowledge and understanding of wider engineering 
disciplines to support the study of safety engineering and disaster management. 
 Critically evaluate and demonstrate awareness of current problems and the state of 
the art in safety engineering and disaster management. 
 Understand appropriate codes of practice and industry standards. 
 Verify principles of design and the design techniques relevant to safety engineering 
and disaster management. 
 
Intellectual Qualities 
 Apply appropriate quantitative science and engineering tools to the analysis and 
solution of problems. 
 Demonstrate creative and innovative ability in the synthesis of solutions and in 
formulating designs to address safety engineering problems. 
 Comprehend the broad picture and thus work with an appropriate level of detail. 
 Critically identify, classify, select and use appropriate computer based methods for 
modelling and analysing safety engineering problems. 
 Classify, and describe the performance of a system and components through the use 
of analytical methods and modelling techniques. 
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 Identify appropriate systems and their use for emergency planning and disaster 
management. 
 Initiate, plan, conduct and report on a programme of original research. 
 Understand and apply a systems based approach to engineering problems. 
 
Professional/ Practical Skills 
 Possess practical engineering skills to define a problem and defend a solution, 
including environmental and sustainability limitations, health and safety and risk 
assessment issues. 
 Identify constraints, manage the design process, and evaluate outcomes relevant to 
Safety Engineering and Disaster Management. 
 Ability to apply quantitative methods and computer based models relevant to Safety 
Engineering and Disaster Management in order to solve engineering problems. 
 Source, understand, and critically review technical literature, current research 
material, and other information sources. 
 Ability to work with technical uncertainty. 
 Undertake experimental laboratory work using relevant test and measurement 
equipment. 




 Critically evaluate data from specialist areas of knowledge in a variety of 
professionally appropriate ways. 
 Assess complex problems using sound judgement and methods based on the 
evaluation of scientific evidence. 
 Demonstrate high level skills in creativity and innovation in problem solving. 
 Exhibit knowledge of management and leadership techniques. 
 Accept accountability for a high level of professional and ethical conduct in 
engineering. 
 Manage time and resources effectively for personal, academic and career 
development. 
 Develop skills that allow for personal enhancement, professional development, and 
lifelong learning. 
 Work with limited, incomplete or contradictory information. 
 Communicate effectively with specialist and non-specialist audiences. 
 
The BEng Safety Engineering and Disaster Management degree with Diploma in 
Professional Practice (International) is a sandwich course of 4 years duration. 
In first year students will develop an understanding of the subject area with an 
introduction to safety engineering and emergencies; real life case studies of disasters will 
be used to demonstrate how and where their skills will be needed on graduation. The 
purpose of this module is to enable students to contextualise their learning in other 
modules. First year is also the time in which the core engineering topics and underpinning 
science is introduced. 
In the second year students will study increasingly specialist topics. The strands of 
safety engineering, disaster management and emergency planning run across the 
semesters ensuring there is a balance with the more science based content. The subjects 
covered will include an international and ethical perspective on safety, which 
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incorporates the legislative requirements, ethical codes and international protocols as they 
relate to health, safety and well-being. Students will study human factors and behaviours 
in emergencies and understand hazard and risk analysis as it applies to safety engineering 
and disaster management. 
Third year will be spent on placement in industry. This is an integral part of the course. 
In final year students will deepen their knowledge and learn how to apply the subjects 
they have studied to solve real engineering problems. There is an emphasis on design and 
practical problem solving to consolidate the theory studied in previous years. For 
example, students will study “prevention through design” where they will learn to 
“design out” or minimise hazards. Structural design, graphical representations for safety 
engineering, and disasters and rescue engineering will all be addressed. Students will 
study leadership and management of an emergency response team and complete a 
dissertation. Details of each of the modules are given below… 
 
YEAR 1 
Introduction to Safety Engineering and Emergencies 
This module will introduce the concepts, theories and principles of safety engineering, 
emergency planning and disaster management. In addition, case studies of emergencies 
will be studied to understand the impacts, lessons learned and the role of engineering in 
managing the associated risks. 
Physics for Engineers 
The general purpose of the module is to give students the knowledge framework in 
physics and develop their skills to apply acquired knowledge to determine solutions to a 
variety of engineering problems within the subject area. 
Properties of Substances and Materials 
Safety engineering and disaster management are evolving fields, requiring increasing 
levels of competency in underpinning sciences. An understanding of substances and 
material properties is crucial when resolving a range of engineering problems. The 
general purpose of the module is to provide students with the fundamental knowledge and 
understanding of a variety of materials, their classification, properties and applications. 
Engineering Mathematics 
This module aims to take students with a range of qualifications and ability in 
mathematics and bring them all to a level in algebra, calculus and statistics, sufficient for 
the solution of a range of problems in engineering, finance and other applications. 
CAD & Design 
The aim of this module is to familiarise students with the role of the Safety Engineer in 
the building design and construction industry. The students will acquire basic CAD 
design skills enabling them to communicate through the use of drawings, and the use of 
computer design tools. 
Fluid Mechanics A 
This module addresses the fundamental principles of fluid statics and dynamics; and sets 
out methods of analysis for elementary hydraulics. The module aims to prepare students 
for the design and problem solving associated with simple hydraulic systems. 
Structural Mechanics 
This module addresses the fundamental principles of structural mechanics and sets out 
methods of analysis for simple structures. 
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Chemistry for Engineers 
The module is designed to ensure that all students entering the course attain the necessary 
scope and depth of knowledge of chemical sciences, so that they become competent in 
physical sciences that underpin safety engineering. 
 
YEAR 2 
Safety: An International and Ethical Perspective 
The professional engineer has to have an understanding of and have the ability to 
implement a ‘prevention through design’ approach to their work, taking account of, 
among others, approaches to design safety analysis, workplace risk assessment, safety 
oriented method statements in the development of engineering design packages. 
This module addresses the ethical responsibility engineers and allied professionals have 
to ensure that public and workers health and safety is at the forefront of all that they do. 
Engineering Mathematics 2 
This level 2 mathematics module aims to take those students to a level in advanced 
algebra, calculus and statistics, sufficient for the solution of a range of modeling 
problems in civil, building services and energy engineering at undergraduate level. 
Hazards and Risk Analysis 
This module is designed to provide a sound understanding of the hazards involved in a 
variety of aspects of engineering design and introduce various analysis and modeling 
tools based on fundamental principles of probability and statistics for risk assessment. 
Heat and Mass Transfer 
This module builds on the fundamental theory of fluid mechanics, heat transfer and 
thermodynamics previously covered by students. The focus is on the advancement of 
these topics with a focus on applications relevant to safety engineers. 
Structural Engineering Design 2 
The Civil/Structural engineer by definition must be able to design simple structural 
components in steel and concrete, singularly and in a composite construction. The module 
seeks to engage students in the design of simpler structural forms, thus providing a sound 
base for design office practice during Industrial Placement and in readiness for the more 
complex final year module. 
Introduction to Combustion for Fire and Explosion Dynamics 
This module is designed to provide a deep understanding of the fundamental physical 
principles underlying fire and explosion development. Particular attention is given to the 
chemical and physical processes associated with fire as a combustion system, fire 
chemistry and toxicity, fire initiation, growth and spread in open and enclosed spaces, 
deflagrations and detonations, blast waves and combustion in closed vessel. 
Human Factors and Behaviours 
An understanding of human factors and behaviours is essential to ensuring the safety of 
occupants in buildings and the extended built environment. This module will address 
human factors relevant to the safety environment and behaviour in emergencies. It will 
also address the psychological impact of involvement in significant events. In particular, 
it will focus on the psychological and behavioural responses of individuals, groups and 




YEAR 4 (Final Year) 
Leading and Managing Emergency Response Teams 
Emergency response projects are complex and highly demanding, involving a number of 
different and well coordinated courses of action. It is vital that these complex activities 
are well planned. Consequently, the success of aid projects in emergency response from 
planning through to the completion stage depends on the various parties’ understanding 
of partnership and mutual trust and the common objectives that they share. The roles of 
parties involved in post-disaster reconstruction should be carefully arranged for the 
performance of reconstruction activities. Ultimately this module addresses the challenges 
of leading and managing people post disaster. 
Prevention through Design 
Prevention through Design (PtD) also known as inherently safe(r) design is well 
established in the process industry. In civil engineering/construction, producing designs 
that are capable of being built, used, maintained and eventually demolished in a safe and 
healthy manner has been implicit in legislation since the Regulations were enacted to 
bring the EU Temporary and Mobile Workers Directive into force. PtD looks beyond the 
idea that reducing/ mitigating the impact of hazards is an issue for those who operate and 
manage facilities to the realisation that hazards need to be identified at the concept stage, 
addressed more fully at the scheme design stage and wherever possible/practical 
eliminated at the detailed design stage. This module delivers the knowledge and 
understanding and develops all the necessary skills to allow safety engineers to practice 
prevention through design. 
Structural Analysis and Design 4 
This module is intended to prepare students to solve real structural engineering problems 
and combines complementary studies in structural analysis and structural design. Design 
is presented as an intellectual methodology and students are exposed to an environment, 
in which they experience the structural engineering design process. The design block 
encompasses the important stages of a full structural engineering design application, 
experienced within a comprehensive design exercise on a structural design set at a high 
professional level. 
Disaster Safety and Resilience 
This module involves the identification and classification of extreme and hazardous 
events, the assessment and quantification of built (including infrastructure) and natural 
environment, vulnerability, robustness and resilience. The students are introduced to the 
provision of information on ecosystem values, human safety, shelter and utility provision 
in relation to design and scenario planning for man-made and natural extreme and 
hazardous events. 
Occupational Health and Safety Management 
The focus of this module is on the policies and strategies, which influence health & safety 
management, and the relevant strategies to deal with the control of serious and imminent 
danger and major accidents. The importance of the social, political and economic 
influences on health and safety is also emphasised. 
Research and Dissertation 
This Research and Dissertation module permits a student to develop further a particular 
element of the course and to apply investigative, analytical and personal management 
skills to an extended and in-depth academic study. This will enhance a student’s 
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technical expertise, but would not necessarily have expertise in hazard 
recognition or the authority to correct identified hazards. 15 
 
Knowledgeable and authorized to act are the key components of competence, 
and there is no doubt that these are important indicators to a persons likely 
competence, but as a definition of competence they are inadequate, and as a 
measure, not sufficient in themselves.   
 
A more appropriate definition of competence would be the consistent skilful 
application of skills and knowledge to any specified work operation (at whatever 
level that may be within the company), where the use of the term skilful implies 
conducting the operation to the highest standards within the field.   
 
In this respect a competent designer is one who consistently produces structural 
designs that can be built, maintained and demolished without causing harm (in its 
widest sense) or hurt to construction/ maintenance workers and end users.  
 
Figure 3:  Relationships Model 
 
Integral to this concept of competence is the notion that, having regard to the 
designer’s age, experience and skill they will know of the hazards and apply the 
controls necessarily associated with the work.16  
 
Importantly, the thread of competence extends throughout a company; 
subordinates, supervisors, managers and executives, each level skillfully 




16 See Dalton v Frendo (1977), Irish Supreme Court. 
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